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This study investigates the determinants and effects of voluntary book-tax 
difference (BTD) disclosures in earnings releases.  Unlike prior studies, I find no 
evidence that managers are more likely to voluntarily disclose BTD information when 
firms have low earnings quality.  I also find that managers are more likely to disclose 
BTD information when firms have large negative but not large positive BTDs.  Because 
BTDs are particularly informative when earnings quality is low and when book income 
significantly exceeds taxable income (i.e., large positive BTDs), these results suggest that 
managers selectively disclose BTD information in earnings releases.  Interestingly, I also 
find that managers are more willing to disclose BTD information when tax avoidance 
activities are high.  This result suggests that managers are willing to bear some tax-
related disclosure costs to reassure investors that BTDs are not due to aggressive 
financial reporting.  
 vii
Prior research provides evidence of a systematic association between BTDs 
computed using required 10-K tax disclosures and future forecast errors and stock 
returns.  I provide evidence that voluntary BTD disclosures attenuate the association 
between BTDs and future forecast errors.  I also provide limited evidence that voluntary 
BTD disclosures attenuate the association between BTDs and future stock returns.  These 
results suggest that voluntary BTD disclosures help analysts and investors impound BTD 
information into earnings forecasts and stock prices. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Book-tax differences (BTDs) contain important information about earnings 
growth and persistence (Lev and Nissim 2004; Hanlon 2005), earnings management 
(Phillips, Pincus, and Rego 2003), effects of accounting method changes (Seidman 2008), 
and tax planning (Mills 1998; Desai and Dharmapala 2006a; Wilson 2008).  Although 
BTDs can be computed using required Form 10-K tax disclosures, investors and analysts 
do not appear to use BTDs in their pricing and forecasting decisions (Lev and Nissim 
2004; Hanlon 2005; Weber 2009).1  In this study, I examine voluntary disclosure of BTD 
information in earnings announcements to address the following research questions.2  
First, what are the determinants of voluntary BTD disclosures in earnings 
announcements?  More specifically, do managers voluntarily disclose BTD information 
when BTDs are most informative to investors?  Second, do voluntary BTD disclosures 
help analysts and investors impound BTD information into earnings forecasts and stock 
prices? 
Existing literature investigating voluntary disclosure of financial statement 
information in earnings releases provide mixed evidence regarding whether managers 
provide information when it is most useful to investors.  Initial studies by Chen, DeFond, 
and Park (2002) and Levi (2008) argue that managers disclose basic balance sheet and 
accruals information in earnings releases when the information is useful to investors.   
These studies argue that managers disclose this information, even when the disclosures 
help market participants unwind the discretionary component of reported earnings, 
                                                 
1 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes (SFAS 109) requires 
public companies to disclose detailed tax information in their 10-K on deferred tax liabilities, deferred tax 
assets, the valuation allowance, current tax expense, deferred tax expense, the benefits of operating loss 
carryforwards, the tax rate reconciliation, etc. (SFAS 109, paragraphs 43-49).  However, firms are not 
required to disclose any specific tax information in earnings releases. 
2 Supplemental analyses also investigate the determinants of BTD disclosure in conference calls. 
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because there is no credible reason to delay disclosure (Levi 2008).  D’Souza, Ramesh, 
and Shen (2008) also provide evidence that managers disclose additional financial 
statement line items when earnings are less informative.  In contrast to Chen et al. (2002) 
and Levi (2008), however, D’Souza et al. (2008) provide evidence suggesting that 
managers who habitually smooth earnings and managers who frequently meet or beat 
analyst forecasts limit financial statement disclosures to retain greater degrees of freedom 
for opportunistic reporting.  D’Souza et al. (2008) do not, however, provide details about 
the specific costs that enable managers to credibly avoid financial statement disclosure. 
In this study, I examine in detail the voluntary disclosure of a single financial 
statement account, deferred taxes.  By investigating the disclosure of BTD information, I 
am able to examine two specific reasons that may enable managers to credibly avoid 
voluntarily disclosing BTD-related information even when the earnings quality is low or 
the information may be particularly informative to investors.3  First, BTD disclosures 
may result in increased proprietary, political, and enforcement costs because BTDs 
contain information about a firm’s tax avoidance activities.  Second, market participants 
may be unsure whether managers have reliable BTD information at the earnings 
announcement date because the tax provision is one of the last items to be finalized 
(Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004).  Thus, BTDs present a setting where managers 
likely have more latitude in their decision to voluntarily disclose financial information 
compared to settings like basic balance sheet or accruals information.  Unlike the prior 
studies, I investigate whether managers can avoid disclosing additional information when 
earnings quality is low or the information is particularly relevant to market participants. 
                                                 
3 In this study, I examine the voluntary disclosure of deferred tax information.  Deferred tax information 
can be used to compute (or at least approximate) both total and temporary BTDs.  As such, I generally refer 
to BTDs rather than deferred taxes. 
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Unlike prior studies, I also use more comprehensive measures of a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure surrounding the earnings release.  Specifically, I partition the press 
release into text and financial statement components.  In supplemental analyses, I also 
evaluate over 3,000 conference call transcripts.  I examine whether the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure vary across these different disclosure types or media.   
It is also important to examine the effects of voluntary BTD disclosures.  Prior 
literature provides evidence that market participants process the focused information 
disclosed in earnings announcements more efficiently than the comprehensive 
information presented in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings (Stice 1991; 
Hollie, Livnat, and Segal 2005; Levi 2008; Louis, Robinson, and Sbaraglia 2008).  As 
such, stock prices and earnings forecasts may more accurately reflect information 
contained in BTDs for firms that disclose BTD information in earnings releases relative 
to firms that do not. 
To address the first research question, I initially examine BTD disclosure in over 
10,000 fourth quarter earnings releases from 1989 to 2006.  I construct a dictionary of 
terms and employ textual analysis to identify firm-years that include BTD-related 
disclosures in earnings releases.  Using a logistic model adapted from Chen et al. (2002), 
I investigate whether BTD disclosures systematically vary with absolute discretionary 
accruals or cash effective tax rates, my proxies for earnings quality (Ayers, Jiang, and 
Laplante 2008) and tax avoidance activities (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008), 
respectively.  In general, managers have disincentives to disclose BTDs that can indicate 
low quality earnings or high tax avoidance activities. 
Evidence that managers are less likely to disclose BTDs when earnings quality is 
low or when firms engage in aggressive tax avoidance activities would be consistent with 
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selective disclosure of BTD information.  Because large positive BTDs are often seen as 
indicative of aggressive financial reporting (Palepu et al. 2000; Revsine et al. 2005), 
disclosure of large positive but not large negative BTDs would also be consistent with 
selective disclosure.  When considering the full press release, however, my results are 
inconsistent with managers selectively disclosing BTD information in earnings releases.  
Specifically, I find that voluntary BTD disclosure is driven by the magnitude of the BTD 
and the level of a firm’s tax avoidance activities.  Moreover, managers are no more or 
less likely to disclose BTD information when firms have large positive BTDs relative to 
large negative BTDs.  These results suggest that firms are more likely to disclose BTD 
information when BTDs are large and when tax avoidance activities are the source of the 
BTD.  Neither of these findings is consistent with selective disclosure of BTD 
information in press releases. 
When the press releases are split into financial statement and text components, the 
results provide some evidence of selective disclosure.  BTD disclosure in the financial 
statement component of the release is largely driven by the magnitude of the BTD.  There 
is limited evidence suggesting that managers are less likely to provide BTD information 
when earnings quality is low but no evidence that tax avoidance activities affect BTD 
disclosure for this component of the release.  In the text component of the release, 
managers are more likely to disclose BTD information when tax avoidance activities are 
high and when firms have large BTDs.  There is no evidence that managers are more or 
less likely to disclose BTD information in the text component of the release when 
earnings quality is low.  There is evidence, however, that managers are more likely to 
emphasize large negative than large positive BTDs, even though large positive BTDs are 
larger in absolute magnitude.  Unlike the full press release results, these results provide 
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some evidence that managers selectively disclose BTD information in earnings releases.  
In supplemental analyses, I also examine disclosure of BTD information in conference 
calls and find similar patterns of disclosure: managers are more likely to disclose BTD 
information when (1) the firm has large negative rather than large positive BTDs and (2) 
tax avoidance activities are the likely source of the BTD. 
To investigate the market effects of voluntary BTD disclosures, I test whether 
BTD disclosures attenuate the systematic association between BTDs and future forecast 
errors and stock returns documented in prior research (Lev and Nissim 2004; Hanlon 
2005; Weber 2009).  Using the ratio of estimated taxable income to book income as a 
proxy for BTDs, I find that BTDs are positively associated with future forecast errors 
only when firms do not voluntarily disclose BTD information.  As expected, when firms 
disclose BTDs in earnings releases, BTDs are no longer associated with future forecast 
errors.  In spite of improved forecasts, however, I find only limited evidence that BTD 
disclosures attenuate the association between BTDs and future stock returns.  Although 
the association between BTDs and one-year ahead stock returns is not statistically 
different across the disclosure and non-disclosure samples, BTDs are not significantly 
associated with future returns for disclosers when evaluating future buy-and-hold returns.  
Supplemental analyses based on calendar-time portfolios also provide some evidence that 
BTD disclosures in earnings announcement alleviate BTD mispricing.  Collectively, 
these results suggest that BTD disclosures in earnings releases improve analysts’ and 
investors’ abilities to use information contained in BTDs. 
My study contributes to two streams of literature.  First, I contribute to the 
literature on voluntary disclosure of accounting information in and around earnings 
releases.  Prior studies provide evidence that managers voluntarily disclose basic 
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financial information when it is most informative to market participants in earnings 
releases, even when the disclosures help market participants unwind the discretionary 
component of reported earnings (Levi 2008).  Evaluating a specific type of accounting 
information, BTDs, where managers are likely to have more latitude in selectively 
disclosing information, I provide evidence that managers are less likely to disclose BTD 
information when the BTDs may indicate aggressive financial reporting.  I do find, 
however, that managers are more willing to emphasize deferred tax information in the 
text component of press releases when the BTDs are likely due to tax avoidance activities 
rather than aggressive financial reporting. 
Second, I contribute to the literature investigating analysts’ and investors’ use of 
BTD information.  Prior studies argue that the systematic forecast and pricing errors are 
due to the complexity of accounting for income taxes (Gleckman et al. 2002; Mintz 1999; 
McGill and Outslay 2002), but they do not investigate whether more focused information 
helps market participants use BTDs.  Weber (2009) provides evidence that investors rely 
on analysts to interpret the complex information contained in BTDs but does not identify 
factors that help analysts use BTDs when setting forecasts.  I address these gaps in the 
literature by investigating whether focused BTD disclosures help market participants use 
BTD information.4  Finding that voluntary BTD disclosures attenuate the association 
between future analyst forecast errors and BTDs provides evidence that focused 
disclosures of BTD information help analysts fulfill their integral role as information 
intermediaries.  Given that BTD disclosures help analysts incorporate BTD information 
into earnings forecasts, the weaker evidence regarding whether BTD disclosures help 
                                                 
4 When I discuss whether voluntary BTD disclosures in earnings releases help market participants use or 
understand “BTDs” (or “BTD information”), I am referring to “BTDs” as computed using 10-K data. 
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investors price BTD information suggests that mispricing of BTD information may be 
only partially due to analysts’ failure to incorporate BTD information in forecasts. 
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Chapter 2: Prior Research and Hypotheses Development – BTD Disclosures 
2.1.  Explaining Disclosure of BTD Information in Earnings Releases 
2.1.1. The Benefits of BTD Disclosures 
 
Theoretical studies by Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985) suggest that managers 
have incentives to voluntarily disclose information useful in assessing firm value in the 
absence of significant disclosure costs or uncertainty about the existence of such private 
information.  Chen et al. (2002) and Levi (2008) assert that disclosing basic financial 
information in earnings releases is useful to investors and results in little cost because the 
information will be disclosed shortly in SEC filings.  Consistent with their argument, the 
authors find that managers disclose balance sheet and accruals information in earnings 
releases when earnings quality is low, even when such disclosures help market 
participants unwind the discretionary component of reported earnings.  
Similar to balance sheet and accruals disclosures, BTD disclosures are useful to 
market participants.  Financial accounting texts argue that taxable income can be used as 
a conservative measure of firm performance because managers have less discretion when 
computing taxable income and fewer incentives to overstate taxable income.  As such, 
BTDs can indicate aggressive financial reporting (Revsine et al. 2005) or manipulation of 
core expenses (Penman 2001).  Palepu et al. (2000) assert that BTDs can act as a “red 
flag” to market participants.   
Recent academic studies confirm that BTDs contain information about the quality 
of reported earnings.  Lev and Nissim (2004) and Hanlon (2005) provide evidence that 
BTDs are systematically related to future earnings.  Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) 
find that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful beyond total and abnormal accruals 
in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid a loss.  
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Finally, Ayers et al. (2008) provide evidence that taxable income is an increasingly 
informative firm performance measure as earnings quality declines.   
BTDs also contain information about tax avoidance activities.  Mills (1998) finds 
that proposed IRS audit adjustments are positively related to large positive BTDs.  Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006a) argue that BTDs contain information about tax sheltering 
activities.  Wilson (2008) provides evidence that BTDs are positively associated with 
actual cases of tax sheltering.  Information about a firm’s tax avoidance activities is 
important to market participants because tax avoidance activities directly and indirectly 
affect firm value.  Directly, tax avoidance activities increase cash flow.5  Given the 
substantial effect of taxes on a firm’s bottom line, effectively managing taxes can 
increase firm value.  However, Desai and Dharmapala (2006a, 2006b) argue that tax 
avoidance activities often result in complex and obscure transactions that can be used to 
mask rent extraction that decreases firm value.  Consistent with tax avoidance having a 
negative effect on firm value, Hanlon and Slemrod (2008) find a negative market reaction 
to news that a firm is engaging in tax sheltering. 
Finally, BTDs contain information about earnings effects of accounting method 
changes (Seidman 2008) and economic fundamentals (Dhaliwal et al. 2008).  
Collectively, prior research suggests that BTDs provide information that is useful to 
market participants in assessing firm value, especially when earnings quality is low or tax 
avoidance activities are high.  As such, managers have incentives to disclose BTD 
information to meet investor demand (Dye 1985). 
                                                 
5  Firms presumably optimize after-tax cash flows, but BTDs will only capture explicit tax avoidance, 
ignoring the effects of implicit taxes. 
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2.1.2. Availability of BTD Information and Potential Costs of BTD Disclosures 
Unlike the voluntary disclosures evaluated in prior studies, market participants 
may believe that disclosing BTD information in earnings releases results in significant 
disclosure costs.  Market participants may also be unsure whether managers have reliable 
BTD information at the earnings announcement date.  I argue that, as a result of the 
uncertainty and disclosure costs, managers can strategically disclose BTD information in 
earnings releases.  
Uncertainty arises because the tax provision is one of the last items to be finalized 
(Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004).  Even though SFAS 109 requires a balance sheet 
approach to measuring tax expense, firms may wish to wait until the 10-K release to 
commit to the portion of total tax expense that is current versus deferred and to the 
balance sheet classification.  Thus, managers may be able to credibly argue that delaying 
disclosure of BTD information until the SEC filing date is necessary to ensure reliable 
reported numbers.  
Voluntary disclosure of BTD information in earnings releases may also result in 
increased enforcement, political, and/or proprietary costs to the firm.6  Theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggests that investors and analysts process the focused information 
in earnings releases more thoroughly than information released later in financial 
statements (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Stice 1991; Hollie, Livnat, and Segal 2005).  
Voluntary BTD disclosures are also likely to be more salient than 10-K disclosures to the 
media, the IRS, regulatory groups, and competitors.  For example, Earnings Digest and 
                                                 
6 McGuire (2008) investigates voluntary disclosure of ETR changes using a sample of 1,611 hand-collected 
earnings releases.  McGuire also considers tax-related disclosure costs and provides evidence of strategic 
disclosure of information pertaining to ETR changes in the text of the earnings release.  By using a large 
sample of over 10,000 earnings releases and focusing on data contained in both the text and financial 
statements, my paper contributes broad evidence that can be compared to other earnings release disclosures 
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Business Brief articles in The Wall Street Journal often discuss BTD-related information 
when changes in deferred tax accounts have a significant impact on quarterly earnings.7  
The IRS already frequently considers large BTDs to signal abusive tax transactions (IR-
2004-92).  Additional media attention regarding firms’ BTDs can direct IRS scrutiny 
toward specific firms, potentially increasing the probability of audit.   
More focused BTD information may also increase political costs.  For example, 
the tax advocacy group Citizens for Tax Justice publishes reports outlining aggressive 
taxpayer strategies and identifying companies known to participate in these strategies.8  
Their 1985 report comparing firms’ effective tax rates to economy-wide and industry-
wide benchmarks influenced base-broadening in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  When 
Enron and Worldcom collapsed, the media highlighted the fact that both companies 
reported substantial profits to its shareholders and paid little to no U.S. tax (Murray 
2002).  More recently, defense contractors that create shell companies in tax haven 
countries to avoid paying payroll taxes on their employees have faced increased scrutiny 
(Stockman 2008).9  This increased attention essentially labels firms as bad “corporate 
citizens” which comes with innate political costs.  In a heightened political environment, 
releasing focused information about a firm’s tax avoidance activities, such as BTD 
information in press releases, can increase a firm’s political costs.   
Finally, disclosing BTD information in earnings releases may also result in 
increased proprietary costs.  Managers face pressure to keep their firms’ ETRs low and in 
                                                                                                                                                 
such as basic balance sheet and accruals information.  This study also provides a broader view of a firm’s 
disclosure decisions by considering disclosures made via conference calls in supplemental analyses. 
7 See Appendix C for excerpts from Business Brief and Earnings Digest articles. 
8 Other speeches, articles, and reports published by Citizens for Tax Justice include “Surge in Corporate 
Tax Welfare Drives Corporate Tax Payments Down to Near Record Low” (Citizens for Tax Justice 2002), 
“Tax Cheats & Their Enablers” (McIntyre 2005), and a speech by Robert McIntyre before the Senate 
Budget Committee in 2007 discussing the nature of the tax gap. 
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line with competitor benchmarks (Treasury 1999; Novack 1998).  Moreover, managers 
are likely to examine financial reports of competitors to determine their relative tax 
positions (Treasury 1999).  Thus, salient disclosure of BTD information in earnings 
releases may provide competitors with proprietary information about a firm’s tax 
avoidance activities. 
2.1.3.  Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures in Earnings Releases 
In the previous section, I established that managers (1) have basic incentives to 
disclose BTDs because they contain information useful in assessing firm value, yet (2) 
may be able to strategically disclose BTD information as a result of information 
uncertainty and potential firm disclosure costs.  In this section, I discuss settings where 
managers may have personal incentives to strategically avoid BTD disclosure in earnings 
releases. 
I first consider the settings where firms have large BTDs.  It is likely that ceteris 
paribus managers are more likely to disclose BTD information when firms have large 
BTDs given the increased materiality of large BTDs.  However, managers’ incentives to 
disclose BTD information may differ depending on whether the large BTD is positive or 
negative.  Since large positive BTDs may indicate aggressive financial reporting (Revsine 
et al. 2005), lower earnings growth (Lev and Nissim 2004), less persistent earnings 
(Hanlon 2005), and/or earnings management activities (Phillips et al. 2003), managers 
may be less likely to disclose information relating to large positive BTDs relative to 
information relating to large negative BTDs.10  To determine whether managers are more 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act closed the loophole allowing defense contractors to 
shelter payroll taxes.  The loophole was closed several months after being written about by the Associated 
Press. 
10 Although Hanlon (2005) provides evidence that firms with large positive or negative BTDs have less 
persistent earnings, financial statement analysis textbooks and prior studies generally focus on large 
positive BTDs (i.e., book income > taxable income) as a signal of aggressive financial reporting. 
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likely to disclose (1) large BTDs relative to small BTDs and (2)  large negative BTDs 
relative to large positive BTDs, I test the following hypotheses (stated in the alternative 
form):  
H1a: Firms with large (positive or negative) BTDs are more likely to disclose BTD 
information in their earnings press releases than firms with small BTDs.  
 
H1b: Firms with large positive BTDs are less likely to disclose BTD information in 
their earnings press releases than firms with large negative BTDs. 
 
Next I consider firms with low earnings quality, a setting where market 
participants are most likely to use alternative signals to assess firm performance.  
Managers have a disincentive in this setting to disclose BTD information that may be 
interpreted by market participants as confirmation of low earnings quality and/or 
managed earnings.  Managers are likely to avoid disclosing BTD information if they can 
credibly delay disclosure due to disclosure costs or information uncertainty.  To 
determine the relation between earnings quality and BTD disclosure, I test the following 
hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):   
H2a:  Firms with lower quality earnings are less likely to disclose BTD information in 
their earnings press releases than firms with higher quality earnings.  
 
The third setting I consider is when firms have both large BTDs and low earnings 
quality.  Market participants are likely to be increasingly interested in large differences 
between book earnings and taxable income as earnings quality declines.  Managerial 
incentives may also vary depending on the size and sign of BTDs.  Because large positive 
BTDs signal low earnings quality and potential earnings management, managers have 
incentives to withhold BTD information when they have large positive BTDs as earnings 
quality declines.  Managers, however, may have an incentive to disclose large negative 
BTDs because these differences are generally inconsistent with managers manipulating 
reported earnings.  To determine whether managers are less likely to disclose BTD 
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information when they have low earnings quality and large positive BTDs, I test the 
following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
H2b: Firms with low earnings quality and large positive BTDs are less likely to 
disclose BTD information than firms with low earnings quality and either large 
negative or small BTDs. 
 
The final setting I consider is where firms engage in significant tax avoidance 
activities.  Tax avoidance activities can mask rent extraction, such as earnings 
management, related-party transactions, and other perquisite consumption behavior 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2006a, 2006b).  Because market participants can use BTDs to 
assess how aggressively a firm is managing its tax liability, managers have a disincentive 
to disclose BTDs that suggest a firm is engaging in significant tax avoidance activities.  
Tax avoidance activities also decrease the informativeness of BTDs as earnings signals.  
Specifically, taxable income is a less relevant performance measure when tax avoidance 
activities are high (Ayers et al. 2008).  As such, managers have less incentive to disclose 
BTDs when tax avoidance activities are high.  To determine the relation between tax 
avoidance activities and BTD disclosure, I test the following hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative form): 
H3:  Firms with higher levels of tax avoidance activities are less likely to disclose BTD 
information in their earnings press releases than firms with lower levels of tax 
avoidance activities.   
 
As stated above, managers may have incentives to avoid disclosing BTD 
information in earnings releases when tax avoidance activities are high because such 
disclosures (1) may result is increased proprietary, political, and enforcement costs to the 
firm and (2) are less informative about earnings.  Avoiding BTD disclosures for these 
two reasons is evidence of selective disclosure by managers but does not indicate that 
managers strategically avoid disclosure due to personal incentives (i.e., to hide rent 
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extraction).  Because it is difficult to determine the exact source of non-disclosure when 
tax avoidance is high, I cannot definitively conclude that support for H3 indicates 
strategic disclosure by managers.  
2.1.3. Potential Trade-offs Among Disclosure Costs 
The previous section argues that disclosure of BTDs could result in increased 
proprietary, political, and enforcement costs.  It is possible that managers may be willing 
to trade-off potential tax-related costs to disclose BTD information suggesting that the 
BTD is due to tax avoidance activities rather than aggressive financial reporting.11  Given 
that investors focus largely on book earnings, managers may be willing to absorb the 
potential tax-related costs associated with disclosing BTDs due to low taxable income in 
order to reassure investors that BTDs are not due to aggressive financial reporting.  If 
managers trade off these costs, I may not find support for H3 or may even find that 
managers are more likely to disclose BTD information when tax avoidance activities are 
high.   
                                                 
11 There is a substantial literature investigating tax and non-tax tradeoffs.  See Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) for a review of the tax and non-tax tradeoff literature. 
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Chapter 3: Prior Research and Hypotheses Development – Market Effects 
3.1. Market Effects of Voluntary Disclosure of BTD Information  
Existing studies provide evidence that BTDs are systematically related to earnings 
growth, earnings persistence, and future returns and forecast errors.   Lev and Nissim 
(2004) measure BTDs as the ratio of taxable income to book earnings, where taxable 
income is estimated by grossing up current tax expense.  They examine whether BTDs 
predict future earnings growth beyond the information contained in cash flows, accruals, 
and deferred taxes. They find that the ratio predicts future earnings growth, with a general 
increase over time in the predictive ability of the metric. Lev and Nissim also find that 
investors do not completely impound BTD information into stock prices, although the 
market becomes more efficient over time.  Using the same BTD measure, Weber (2009) 
provides evidence that BTDs are also systematically related to future forecast errors.   
Hanlon (2005) investigates the role of temporary BTDs in: (1) indicating the 
persistence of earnings, accruals, and cash flows and (2) influencing investors’ 
assessments of the persistence of earnings and earnings components.  She finds that firms 
with large BTDs have less persistent earnings.  For firms with large positive BTDs, 
investors price the accruals component of earnings in a manner consistent with its lower 
persistence.  Interestingly, investors underestimate the persistence of the cash flow 
component of earnings for firms with large positive BTDs.  Investors still overestimate 
the persistence of accruals for firms with small or large negative temporary BTDs.   
Collectively, these studies suggest that investors and analysts fail to impound BTD 
information contained in 10-K filings into stock prices and earnings forecasts. 
Early analytical research on financial reporting generally assumes that the form of 
disclosure does not affect investors’ abilities to incorporate publicly available information 
into market prices.  However, empirical studies find that disclosure form matters.  Using 
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a sample of firms that issue earnings releases after filing with the SEC, Stice (1991) finds 
no significant reaction until the subsequent earnings announcement.  Using a similar 
sample in later years, Chung, Jacob, and Tang (2003) find a significant market response 
to both SEC filings and press releases.12  Regardless of whether there is an insignificant 
or incomplete price reaction to the SEC filings, the continued price reaction to the 
subsequent earnings releases suggests that the SEC filings fail to fully communicate 
earnings information to some investors. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) reconcile prior theoretical and empirical findings by 
assuming that investors have limited attention and processing power.  Their model 
demonstrates that investors more easily absorb information presented in a salient, easily 
processed form.  Consistent with Hirshleifer and Teoh’s (2003) predictions, Louis et al. 
(2008) and Levi (2008) find that additional disclosure of accruals-related information in 
earnings press releases helps investors differentiate between discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components of accruals.  Specifically, Levi (2008) investigates the 
association between accruals and future returns using a size-adjusted buy-and-hold 
returns approach and a calendar-time hedge portfolio approach.  Forming portfolios six 
days after the 10-Q filing date, Levi finds that accruals are related to future returns for 
firms that only provide accruals information in their 10-Q but are not related to future 
returns for firms that disclose detailed accruals information earlier in their earnings 
announcement.  Louis et al. (2008) investigate the pricing of discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals around earnings announcement and SEC filing dates.  Louis et al. 
find that investors differentially (do not differentially) price discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals around earnings announcements for firms that disclose (do not 
                                                 
12 Investors’ perception of financial information also differs depending on whether an item is disclosed or 
recognized (Aboody 1996; Davis-Friday, Folami, Liu, and Mittelstaedt 1999). 
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disclose) detailed accruals information in their earnings release.  Louis et al. also find that 
accrual mispricing for firms that do not disclose accruals-related information in press 
releases is only partially corrected around the filing date.   These results suggest that 
disclosing additional accruals information in earnings releases helps investors properly 
price accruals information. 
   Collectively, prior research suggests that (1) market participants absorb 
information more easily when the information is presented in an easily processed form 
and (2) earnings releases are a source of easily processed financial information.  Thus, I 
predict that analysts and investors impound information contained in BTDs into earnings 
forecasts and stock prices more completely when firms disclose BTD information in 
press releases.  This leads to my final two hypotheses (stated in the alternative form): 
H4a:  The relation between current BTDs and future analyst forecasts errors is weaker 
when firms disclose BTD information in press releases than when firms do not 
disclose BTD information in press releases. 
 
H4b:  The relation between current BTDs and future returns is weaker when firms 
disclose BTD information in press releases than when firms do not disclose BTD 
information in press releases. 
 
 I may fail to find evidence supporting H4a and H4b for two reasons.  First, 
unraveling the information in BTDs is difficult.  Because BTDs contain complex 
information about a host of firm and economic factors, disclosure of BTDs in earnings 
releases may not be sufficient to improve market participants’ understanding of BTDs.  
Consistent with this possibility, Plumlee (2003) provides evidence that analysts struggle 
to incorporate complex tax information into earnings forecasts.  Moreover, Weber (2009) 
provides evidence that investors generally rely on analysts to communicate the 
information contained in BTDs via earnings forecasts or analyst reports.  Thus, if 
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additional BTD disclosures do not help analysts use BTD information, that failure may 
also result in failure of investors to impound BTD information into share prices.  
 Second, as discussed in Chapter 2, managers have incentives to avoid disclosing 
information that may indicate low earnings quality or earnings management.  As such, 
managers may only disclose BTDs when they are less informative about future earnings.  
If managers strategically disclose BTDs, these disclosures may not help market 
participants understand BTDs. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design – Disclosure Tests 
4.1. Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures in Earnings Releases  
 
To identify the determinants of BTD disclosures in earnings releases, I adapt the 
methodology used in Chen et al. (2002) and Levi (2008) and estimate the following 
logistic regression:  
BtdDisck,i,t= 
αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTEi,t + β2LrgNegDTEi,t  + β3AbsDAi,t + 
β4CashETRi,t + β5AbsDAi,t*LrgPosDTEi,t + β6AbsDAi,t*LrgNegDTEi,t 
+ β7NOLi,t + β8ForOpsi,t + β9DiscOpsi,t + β10M&Ai,t + β11HighTechi,t 
+ β12PyLossi,t + β13Agei,t + β14MBi,t + β15MVi,t + β16AFoli,t + 
β17RetVoli,t + β18AbsFErri,t + β19EarnAnnLagi,t + εi,t, 
(1)
   
where BtdDisck,i.t= one if firm i’s fourth quarter earnings announcement component k 
at the end of year t includes BTD-related information and zero 
otherwise.  k equals Full, Fin, or Text when the full earnings 
release, the financial statement component, or the text component 
of the release, respectively, is the basis of the dependent variable.    
See Appendix B for the search terms used to construct this variable. 
αind =  industry-specific fixed effect based on 2-digit SIC code. 
αyear =  year-specific fixed effect. 
DTEi,t = firm i’s deferred tax expense in the year t grossed up by the 
statutory tax rate; DTE is scaled by average total assets. 
LrgPosDTEi,t = one if firm i’s DTE is in the highest quintile of firm DTEs in year t 
and zero otherwise. 
LrgNegDTEi,t = one if firm i’s DTE is in the lowest quintile of firm DTEs in year t 
and zero otherwise. 
AbsDAi,t = one of two earnings quality measures.  The first (AbsDA) is the 
absolute value of firm i’s discretionary accruals at the end of year t, 
estimated using a modified Jones’ model (DeFond and Subramayan 
1998).  The second (HighAbsDA) equals one if firm i’s AbsDA is in 
the highest quintile of all firm AbsDA in year t and zero otherwise. 
CashETRi,t = one of two cash ETR measures.  The first (CashETR) is firm i’s 
ratio of cash taxes paid to pretax income at the end of year t. The 
second (LowCashETR) equals one if firm i’s cash ETR is in the 
lowest quintile of all firm cash ETRs in year t and zero otherwise. 
NOLi,t = one if firm i reports a net operating loss carryforward at the end of 
year t and zero otherwise. 
ForOpsi,t = one if firm i reports non-zero foreign pretax income in year t and 
zero otherwise. 
DiscOpsi,t = one if firm i reports discontinued operations in year t and zero 
otherwise. 
M&Ai,t = one if firm i reports merger and acquisition activity during the 
current year and zero otherwise. 
HighTechi,t = one if firm i’s SIC code in year t is in 2833-2836 (drugs), 8731-
8734 (R&D services), 7371-7379 (programming), 3570-3577 
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(computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), or 3810-3845 (precise 
measurement instruments) and zero otherwise. 
PyLossi,t = one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and zero otherwise. 
Agei,t = the current year minus the first year firm i is publicly traded 
(according to the CRSP database). 
MBi,t =  firm i’s ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity at the 
end of year t. 
MVi,t =  the natural log of firm i’s market value at the end of year t. 
AFoli,t = the number of unique analysts following firm i (per I/B/E/S) in year 
t. 
RetVoli,t = the standard deviation of firm i’s stock returns over the 250 days 
prior to the earnings announcement date (where at least 100 days of 
stock returns are required for inclusion in the sample). 
AbsFErri,t = an indicator variable coded as one if the absolute value of firm i’s 
forecast error (defined as reported earnings minus the most recent 
consensus mean analysts’ forecast from the I/B/E/S database) is 
larger than one cent during the current year and zero otherwise. 
EarnAnnLagi,t = The number of days between the fiscal year-end date and the 
earnings announcement. 
 
The primary variables of interest in equation (1) are LrgPosDTE, LrgNegDTE, 
AbsDA, and CashETR.  Consistent with H1a, I anticipate that ceteris paribus managers 
are more likely to disclose BTD information when firms have large BTDs.  Thus I 
anticipate a positive β1 and β2.  Since large positive BTDs may indicate earnings 
management, however, managers may be less likely to disclose information relating to 
large positive BTDs.  Thus, I predict that β1 is less than β2.  Evaluating the coefficients 
on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE addresses H1a and H1b. 
Ayers et al. (2008) use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
low earnings quality and find that taxable income, and thus BTDs, is particularly 
informative for firms that have high absolute discretionary accruals.  I likewise use the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings quality.  A positive 
coefficient on AbsDA suggests that managers disclose BTD information when it is most 
useful to market participants rather than delaying disclosure until the 10-K filing.  A 
negative coefficient suggests that managers delay disclosure as earnings quality declines.   
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I include two interaction terms, AbsDA*LrgPosDTE and AbsDA*LrgNegDTE, to 
determine whether the association between discretionary accruals and BTD disclosure 
varies with the size and sign of BTDs.  Market participants may be increasingly 
interested in large differences between book earnings and taxable income as earnings 
quality declines.  Managerial incentives may also vary depending on the size and sign of 
BTDs.  Because large positive BTDs signal low earnings quality and potential earnings 
management, managers have incentives to withhold BTD information when they have 
large positive BTDs.  Managers, however, may have an incentive to disclose large 
negative BTDs because these differences are generally inconsistent with managers 
manipulating reported earnings.  A positive and significant coefficient on both of these 
interactions suggests managers are willing to disclose large BTDs, which become 
increasingly informative as earnings quality declines.  A positive coefficient on 
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE and a negative (or insignificant) coefficient on AbsDA*LrgPosDTE 
suggests that, managers are only willing to disclose BTD information that does not 
suggest potential earnings management.  Evaluating the coefficients on AbsDA and the 
related interactions addresses H2a and H2b. 
Using a firm’s single-year cash ETR as a proxy for tax avoidance activities 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008), the coefficients on the cash ETR measures, 
CashETR and LowCashETR, determine whether voluntary BTD disclosure varies with 
tax avoidance activities.  If managers disclose BTDs as a signal about tax avoidance 
activities because they cannot credibly delay disclosure or because they want to convey 
to the market that the BTD is not due to aggressive financial reporting, the coefficient on 
CashETR (LowCashETR) will be negative (positive).  If managers selectively disclose 
BTDs due to tax avoidance activities because the BTDs are less informative to investors 
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about earnings quality or because tax avoidance activities can signal potential rent 
extraction by managers, the coefficient on CashETR (LowCashETR) will be positive 
(negative).  Evaluating the coefficients on CashETR addresses H3. 
I also control for several sources of significant BTDs that are likely to be 
associated with BTD disclosures.  Net operating losses often result in large deferred tax 
assets that are likely to be reported in earnings announcements when firms report detailed 
balance sheets.  Foreign operations can result in large deferred tax liabilities if firms’ 
foreign operations are located in low tax jurisdictions.  Firms operating in high 
technology industries are often eligible for large research and development credits and 
have greater ability to shift taxable income.  Mergers and acquisitions and discontinued 
operations also often result in significant differences between book and taxable income.  
To control for these sources of BTDs, I include dummy variables indicating whether a 
firm has net operating losses (NOL), foreign operations (ForOps), merger and acquisition 
activity (M&A), discontinued operations (DiscOps), or operates in a high tech industry 
(HighTech).  I anticipate these variables to be positively associated with BTD disclosures.   
I also control for firm characteristics that prior literature finds to be significant 
predictors of voluntary disclosures in earnings releases.  Chen et al. (2002) predict that 
firms with relatively uncertain future earnings disclose balance sheet information in press 
releases.  They find that firms with recent losses (PyLoss), more volatile stock returns 
(RetVol), and larger forecast errors (AbsFErr) are more likely to disclose balance sheet 
information in press releases.  Younger firms (Age), larger firms (MV), and firms with 
lower market-to-book ratios (MB) are also more likely to have balance sheet disclosures. 
I include year-specific fixed effects to control for time-specific economic or tax 
law changes that can impact the levels of BTDs and BTD disclosures.  I include industry-
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specific fixed effects based on 2-digit SIC codes to control for industry differences in 
BTDs and BTD disclosure.  In equation (1) and the remaining equations, I also compute 
Huber-White robust standard errors (Rogers 1993) that provide heteroskedasticity-robust 
t-statistics by correcting for dependence within a cluster of observations per firm.   
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Chapter 5: Research Design – Market Effects 
5.1. One-Year Ahead Forecast Errors 
 
 Before investigating whether BTD disclosures help analysts incorporate BTD 
information in earnings forecasts, I estimate equation (2) as a benchmark to establish that 
the systematic association between the ratio of taxable to book income (TAX) and future 
forecast errors documented in prior literature holds in my sample.13 
 FErri,t+1 = 
αind + αyear + β1rTaxi,t + β2MVi,t + β3MBi,t + β4∆AFoli,t+1  + β5PyFEi,t 
+ β6Acci,t + εi,t, 
(2)
   
where FErri,t+1 = firm i’s actual t+1 earnings minus the median individual forecast 
made during month 1 (or month 5), scaled by month 1 stock price. 
rTaxi,t =  firm i’s decile ranking based on the ratio of taxable income to book 
income (TAX) in year t, scaled to a [0,1] range. 
MVi,t =  the natural log of firm i’s market value at the end of year t. 
MBi,t =  firm i’s ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity at the 
end of year t. 
∆AFoli,t+1 =  the change in the number of unique analysts making earnings 
forecasts for firm i from year t to year t+1, scaled by the number of 
analysts from year t. 
PyFEi,t =  firm i’s actual year t earnings minus the median individual forecast of 
those earnings from midyear (month 6) of year t, scaled by stock 
price (Teoh and Wong 2002). 
Acci,t =  the ratio of firm i’s total accruals to total assets at the end of year t.   
 
 Consistent with Weber (2009), I anticipate that forecast errors are more optimistic 
(i.e., more negative) for firms with smaller ratios of taxable income to book income.  This 
would result in a positive relation between FErr and rTax, suggesting that analysts’ 
forecasts fail to fully reflect that firms with low TAX ratios tend to have less favorable 
future earnings outcomes.    
Equation (2) also contains control variables that prior literature finds to be 
significant predictors of future forecast errors.  Larger firms and growth firms tend to 
have fewer negative earnings surprises (Brown 1997; Brown 2001; Matsumoto 2002).  
                                                 
13 The forecast error tests are based on methodology used in Weber (2009); the stock return tests are based 
on methodology used in Lev and Nissim (2004) and Weber (2009). See Appendix A for more detailed 
information about the construction of the variables. 
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As such, I include MV and MB to control for size and growth.  I expect a positive 
coefficient on both variables.  I include the change in analyst following to control for the 
concern that analysts will drop coverage of low TAX firms in anticipation of weak 
earnings prospects, resulting in optimistically biased forecast errors (Weber 2009).   I 
include PyFE to control for the positive serial correlation in analysts’ forecast errors 
(Abarbanell and Bernard 1992) and expect a positive coefficient on PyFE.  Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan (2001) find that analysts’ forecasts do not incorporate the 
predictable future earnings declines associated with high accruals.  I include the ratio of 
total accruals to assets to control for this association and expect a negative relationship 
between forecast errors and accounting accruals.  I include industry and year fixed effects 
to address potential concerns regarding industry or time factors. 
To test H4a, I modify equation (2) to incorporate disclosure of BTD-related 
information in firms’ fourth quarter earnings releases, creating the following empirical 
model: 
 FErri,t+1 = 
αind + αyear + β1rTaxi,t + β2BtdDisci,t + β3MVi,t + β4MBi,t + 
β5∆AFoli,t+1 + β6PyFEi,t + β7Acci,t + β8BtdDisc*rTaxi,t + εi,t, 
(3)
   
 where BtdDisci,t =  one if firm i’s fourth quarter earnings announcement at the end of 
year t includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise. 
 
 All other variables are as previously defined.  The variable of interest in equation 
(3) is the BtdDisc*rTax interaction.  If voluntary disclosures of BTD-related information 
in press releases help analysts incorporate the earnings implications of BTDs into their 
forecasts, β8 will be negative and significant.  I include BtdDisc to control for systematic 
differences between firms that disclose BTD information and firms that do not.  I make 
no prediction for this variable.  
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5.1. Stock Returns 
5.1.1.  Twelve Month Buy-and-Hold Stock Returns 
 
 Before investigating whether BTD disclosures help investors properly price the 
implications of BTDs, I estimate equation (4) as a benchmark to establish that the 
systematic association between the ratio of taxable to book income and future stock 
returns documented in prior literature holds in my sample. 
 SARi,t+1 = αind + αyear + β1rTaxi,t + β2MVi,t + β3MBi,t + β4Betai,t + β5EPi,t + 
β6SARi,t + β7Acci,t + εi,t, 
(4)
   
where SARi.t+1 =  firm i’s size-adjusted annual buy-hold return starting four months 
after the end of fiscal year t, calculated as the raw annual return 
minus the return on the corresponding size decile portfolio from the 
CRSP database. 
Betai,t = firm i’s measure of systematic risk estimated using monthly stock 
returns and CRSP value-weighted index returns (including 
distributions) during the five years that end in the fourth month of 
year t+1 (Fama and French 1992). 
EPi,t = firm i’s ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to market value 
of common equity at the end of year t (Basu 1977). 
SARi,t = firm i’s the size-adjusted return from the previous year (Jegadeesh 
and Titman 1993). 
 
I convert the control variables to annual decile rankings and scale them to range 
from zero to one.  I can then interpret the estimated coefficients as the return on a zero 
investment portfolio with a long position in the firm-years in the highest decile and a 
short position in the firm-years in the lowest decile (Bernard and Thomas 1990).  
Consistent with prior literature, I anticipate that future returns are positively associated 
with the decile rankings of the ratio of taxable to book income (rTax), the earnings-price 
ratio (EP), past price momentum (SAR), and systematic risk (Beta).  I expect future 
returns to be negatively associated with firm size (MV), the market-to-book ratio (MB), 
and accruals (Acc). 
To test H4b, I modify equation (4) to incorporate disclosure of BTD information 
in earnings releases, creating the following empirical model: 
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SARi,t+1 = 
αind + αyear + β1rTaxi,t + β2BtdDisci,t + β3MVi,t + β4MBi,t + β5Betai,t + 
β6EPi,t + β7SARi,t + β8Acci,t + β9BtdDisc*rTaxi,t + εi,t, 
(5)
   
All variables are as previously defined.  The variable of interest in equation (5) is the 
BtdDisc*rTax interaction.  If voluntary disclosures of BTD-related information in press 
releases help investors impound the earnings implications of BTDs into stock prices, β9 
will be negative and significant.  I include BtdDisc as an additional control variable but 
make no prediction for this variable. 
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Chapter 6: Sample 
 
To identify the determinants and effects of voluntary BTD disclosures, I construct 
several samples in this study that vary in data restrictions.  Less restrictive samples are 
used to replicate findings in prior studies to use as benchmarks to my findings.  More 
restrictive samples, such as those requiring press release data, are used in my primary 
analyses.  Table 1 outlines the sample construction process.  I discuss the construction of 
the disclosure test sample first, the forecast error test sample second, and the stock return 
test sample third. 
6.1. Disclosure Test Sample 
 
The starting point for my disclosure test sample (Table 1, Panel A) is all firms 
from 1989 to 2006 used in later stock return analyses.  The stock return sample is used as 
the starting point because it is the least restrictive sample used in later analyses.  This 
sample excludes (1) firms that do not have the necessary Compustat and CRSP data 
required in the returns tests, (2) firms incorporated outside the U.S., (3) firms with 
negative income before extraordinary items, and (4) financial and utility firms.14  These 
data restrictions result in an initial sample of 44,065 firm-year observations.  I collect 
earnings releases based on this initial sample. 
The press release dataset consists of earnings releases from 1989 through 2006 
available through Factiva.15  In order to get a high percentage of press releases for firms 
contained in the initial sample, I merge historical company names into the sample.  Using 
the current company names, I also collect Factiva FDS codes which track a firm on 
                                                 
14 Consistent with Lev and Nissim (2004) and Weber (2009), I delete firms with negative income before 
extraordinary items because the ratio of taxable income to book income is not meaningful when firms have 
negative book income.  Although my study is only generalizable to profitable firms, the sample includes 
profitable firms with net operating losses, for whom tax information can be especially useful. 
15 To maximize the efficiency of the collection process, I only collect releases for firms with at least five 
firm-year observations in the stock return test sample between 1989 and 2006. 
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Factiva through time.  I then search the Business Wire and the PR Newswire services for 
each firm’s earnings-related press releases using the current name, historical names, and 
FDS code. 16    This process yields a total of 220,217 quarterly earnings releases.  Most of 
these releases are for the first, second, or third quarters.  To ensure that I retain only 
fourth quarter earnings press releases, I require a firm’s Factiva earnings release date to 
match its fourth quarter earnings release date reported on I/B/E/S or Compustat.  Where 
I/B/E/S and Compustat earnings release dates differ for a firm-year observation, I retain 
the earliest earnings release date.  This results in a sample of 33,423 fourth quarter 
earnings releases.  Finally, I eliminate firms that do not have the necessary Compustat, 
I/B/E/S, and CRSP data required in the disclosure tests.  This yields a final disclosure test 
sample of 17,544 firm-year observations. 
6.2. Forecast Error Test Sample 
 
The initial forecast error test sample (Table 1, Panel B) includes firm-year 
observations between 1985 and 2006 that contain all necessary I/B/E/S and Compustat 
data to estimate equation (2).  For this sample, I download annual firm-year earnings 
forecasts from 1983 to 2006 from the I/B/E/S Detail History file.  I use the Detail History 
file to create consensus forecasts, rather than using consensus forecasts from the I/B/E/S 
Summary file, to avoid the problem of stale forecasts being included in the consensus 
(Ramnath et al. 2005).  To compute firm-year consensus forecasts, I create rolling 30-day 
forecasting periods beginning the day after the current fiscal year (year t) earnings 
announcement (EA).   For each firm, the consensus forecast for a given 30-day 
forecasting period equals the median of all forecasts made during the period for the 
                                                 
16 The actual search is: (HLP=(result$1 or earn$4 or EPS) or TD=(earnings per share) or TD=(EPS)) and 
RST=(PRN or BWR) and NS=C15 and (FDS=(Insert company FDS code) or HLP=(Insert company name) 
or HLP=(Insert company historical names)).  “NS=15” requires the releases to be related to corporate 
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following fiscal year earnings (year t+1).17  If an analyst issued multiple forecasts for a 
given firm during a 30-day forecasting period, I retain only the most recent forecast.  
Forecast errors are computed for each period as the difference between that period’s 
consensus forecast of year t+1 earnings and the actual realization of the t+1 earnings.  
Price-scaled forecast errors are computed by dividing the forecast errors by month 1 
stock price.  I focus on forecast errors in the first (EA plus 1 day through EA plus 30 
days) and fifth (EA plus 121 days through EA plus 150 days) forecasting periods in my 
primary analyses.  The first forecasting period (‘month 1’) is the earliest period 
subsequent to the release of year t earnings and also minimizes analysts’ access to year 
t+1 earnings information (i.e., no year t+1 quarterly earnings announcements).  
Alternatively, focusing on forecast errors during the fifth forecasting period (‘month 5’) 
ensures that analysts have access to all information in the annual report.  I eliminate firms 
incorporated outside the U.S., firms with negative income before extraordinary items, and 
financial and utility firms.  This yields a sample of 22,391 firm-year observations.  
Restricting the sample to observations that have month 1 (month 5) forecast errors results 
in 19,905 (15,327) observations between.  I use these samples to replicate results from 
Weber (2009); these results serve as a benchmark for my primary analyses.  Next, I 
merge earnings release data into the month 1 and month 5 datasets.  I eliminate firm-year 
observations with no press release data resulting in 10,675 month 1 and 7,770 month 5 
forecast error firm-year observations.  These datasets are used to estimate equation (3). 
The final forecast error tests also require all necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, and 
CRSP-based disclosure variables.  These additional data restrictions result in 9,921 
                                                                                                                                                 
performance.  See the following link for additional information explaining Factiva search codes: 
http://www.library.hbs.edu/helpsheets/factivahelp.html. 
 32
month 1 and 7,240 month 5 firm-year observations.  These final samples are used in two-
stage analyses that predict disclosure of deferred tax information in the first stage and 
then, controlling for the endogeneity of the disclosure decision, estimate the effect of 
voluntary deferred tax disclosure on analysts’ abilities to incorporate BTD information in 
their earnings forecasts.  
6.3. Stock Return Test Sample 
 
The initial stock return test sample (Table 1, Panel C) includes firm-year 
observations between 1985 and 2006 that contain all necessary CRSP and Compustat 
data to estimate equation (4).  I eliminate firms incorporated outside the U.S., firms with 
negative income before extraordinary items, and financial and utility firms.  This yields a 
sample of 52,978 firm-year observations.  Next I merge earnings release data into the 
stock return sample.  Retaining firms from 1989-2006 with press release data results in 
19,767 firm-year observations.  I use this sample to estimate equation (5).   
The two-stage stock return tests also require all necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, 
and CRSP-based disclosure variables.  These additional data restrictions result in 15,838 
firm-year observations.  The final stock return sample is used in a two-stage analysis that 
predicts disclosure of deferred tax information in the first stage and then, controlling for 
the endogeneity of the disclosure decision, estimates the effect of voluntary deferred tax 
disclosure on investors’ abilities to impound BTD information into stock prices. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Prior to forming the consensus forecasts, I eliminate individual forecasts in the highest and lowest one 
percent of the distribution of price-scaled forecast errors to remove the effects of anomalous data and 
outliers. 
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Chapter 7: Descriptive Statistics and Trends 
7.1. Classification of Disclosers and Non-Disclosers 
 
Using the dictionary of terms listed in Appendix B, I use textual analysis to 
identify firms that provide information that may assist market participants in processing 
information contained in BTDs.  I initially classify firm-year observations as “disclosers” 
when press releases contain one or more of the primary deferred tax terms (see Appendix 
B).  Firm-year observations without any primary deferred tax terms are classified as non-
disclosures.  I also partition the earnings releases into financial statement and text only 
components and use textual analysis on these earnings release components. 
7.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the two-stage forecast error sample and 
for subsamples partitioned by BTD disclosure.18  I provide descriptive statistics for the 
two-stage forecast error sample because it contains the most common observations across 
the disclosure, forecast error, and stock return samples.  On average, firms that disclose 
BTD information in earnings releases (disclosers) are larger, as measured by Assets and 
MktCap.  Disclosers are more profitable in the current year, as measured by ROA, than 
firms that do not disclose BTD information (non-disclosers) but are slightly more likely 
to have reported a prior year loss (PyLoss).  Fewer analysts follow non-disclosers (AFol) 
but those analysts issue more optimistic forecasts (FErrt+1).  Consistent with 
expectations, disclosers are more likely than non-disclosers to have net operating losses 
(NOL), foreign operations (ForOps), and discontinued operations (DiscOps).  Disclosers 
are also more likely than non-disclosers to operate in high tech industries (HighTech).  
Interestingly, disclosers have larger positive differences between book and taxable 
                                                 
18 Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their respective distributions.  Forecast errors are 
not winsorized because outlying individual forecasts are eliminated prior to forming consensus forecasts as 
outlined in Weber (2008). 
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income, as measured by total (TAX) and temporary (DTE) BTDs.  Disclosers also have 
higher absolute discretionary accruals (AbsDA), suggesting lower earnings quality than 
non-disclosers.  Although disclosers have higher signed discretionary accruals (DA), 
there is no significant difference between signed discretionary accruals across disclosers 
and non-disclosers.  Inconsistent with managers avoiding BTD disclosure when tax 
avoidance activities are high, disclosers engage in higher levels of tax avoidance than 
non-disclosers, as evidenced by CashETR and ETR.   
7.3. Disclosure Trends 
 Figures 1 and 2 document basic trends in fourth quarter earnings release 
disclosure patterns from 1989 to 2006.  Specifically, figures 1 and 2 document the change 
in the length of releases and the time lag between the fiscal year-end date and the 
earnings announcement date, respectively.  Overall, firms have consistently increased the 
amount of information they provide via earnings releases.  In 1989, press releases 
averaged less than 850 words whereas releases averaged approximately 3,500 words by 
2006.  The amount of time that elapsed between the fiscal year-end date and the earnings 
announcement declined from approximately 28 days in 1989 to approximately 26 days in 
1996 through 2000.  Since 2000, the time lag has monotonically increased with firms in 
2006 averaging over 30 days between the fiscal year-end date and the earnings release.   
 Figures 3 through 8 provide more detailed information on trends in disclosure of 
specific types of tax information in earnings releases from 1989 through 2006.  The trend 
data is based on searching earnings releases for specific words or phrases and grouping 
those search terms into different tax categories.  See Appendix B for a complete list of all 
search terms and categories.  Figures 3 and 4 document the change in discussion of 
effective tax rates and cash tax rates in earnings releases over time, respectively.  
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Between 1989 and 1999, the percentage of earnings releases that contained terms such 
“effective tax”, “ETR,” and “book tax rate” ranged from as low as five percent of 
releases to as high as 7.5 percent of releases.  In 2000, the percentage of releases that 
discussed effective tax rates monotonically increased and reached 25.80 percent in 2006.  
Figure 4 provides evidence that cash taxes are discussed much less frequently in earnings 
releases.  From 1989 to 2000, less than one percent of release contained terms such as 
“cash tax,” “cash effective tax,” “cash ETR,” “taxes paid,” or “tax paid.”   Beginning in 
2001, managers began disclosing more cash tax information and the percentage of 
earnings releases containing cash tax terms increased from approximately two percent in 
2001 to over six percent in 2006. 
 Figure 5 documents the changes in the discussion of book-tax differences, tax 
avoidance, tax shelters, and tax rate reconciliation terms.  None of these tax categories 
are discussed often.  The discussion of tax avoidance terms such as “tax plan,” “tax sav,” 
and “tax manage” peak in 2004 and are only mentioned in approximately two percent of 
earnings releases.  Not surprisingly, tax shelters are rarely mentioned in earnings releases 
and peak at approximately .4 percent in 2002.  Terms intended to directly identify 
discussion of book-tax differences such as “book-tax diff,” book-tax gap,” and “tax gap” 
are also rarely mentioned in earnings releases.  Interestingly, the percentage of earnings 
releases that contain these terms increases monotonically from 2002 to 2006.  In 2006, 
only .75 percent of earnings releases contained a BTD search term. 
 Figure 6 documents changes in the discussion of domestic and foreign operations 
and tax terms.  None of the categories included in this figure – domestic operations, 
foreign operations, domestic tax, and foreign tax – were discussed in more than three 
percent of releases until after 2003.  Discussion of foreign operations (foreign taxes) 
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increased after 2003 and peaked at approximately 12.5 percent in 2005 (5.5 percent in 
2006).  Discussion of domestic operations (domestic taxes) peaked at 3 percent in 2004 
(3.8 percent in 2006).   
 Figure 7 documents the change in deferred tax information in earnings releases.  
The search terms included in figure 7, such as “deferred tax” and “deferred income tax,” 
form the foundation for my empirical tests.  In 1989, only 13.1 percent of earnings 
releases contained one of the primary deferred tax terms.  From 1989 to 2006, discussion 
of these primary deferred tax terms increased almost monotonically to approximately 
66.7 percent in 2006.  Evaluating the disclosure trends of deferred tax information in the 
financial statement and text components of earnings releases provides evidence that the 
placement of deferred tax information in earnings releases has not remained constant 
through time.  In early years, deferred tax information was primarily disclosed in the text 
component of the press release.  During the 1990s, fewer firms disclosed deferred tax 
information in the text component of releases and there was a dramatic drop in disclosure 
of deferred tax information in the text of earnings releases between 1999 and 2001.  This 
coincided with increased scrutiny of deferred taxes and book-tax differences by 
academics and the media.  In 2002, there was a surge in text deferred tax disclosure as 
approximately 20 percent of releases contained textual discussion of deferred taxes.  This 
dropped in subsequent years and ranged between approximately five and 10 percent 
between 2003 and 2006.  Unlike deferred tax text disclosures, deferred tax financial 
statement disclosures increased fairly consistently from 1989 to 2006.  This trend is likely 
due to both a general trend by firms to include financial statements in their earnings 
releases and larger BTDs through time.  Interestingly, these trends suggest that managers 
may exercise little discretion over financial statement disclosures but that they may 
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exercise discretion over textual disclosures emphasizing deferred tax and BTD 
information.  
 Figure 8 also documents the change in terms related to deferred taxes.  I classify 
these terms as “secondary” deferred tax terms because these terms do not indicate that the 
earnings release contains information that market participants can use to approximate my 
empirical measures of BTDs.  These secondary terms include phrases such as “valuation 
allowance,” “contingent tax,” “tax cushion,” and “permanently reinvest.”  Overall, 
managers infrequently discuss these terms from 1989 to 2001.  The percentage of releases 
that contain secondary deferred tax terms does increase from approximately four percent 
in 2002 to 14 percent in 2006.   
 The final figure documents the trends in several of the empirical tax measures 
used in this study.  Figure 9 documents that the gap between book and taxable income 
has grown through time, as evidenced by TAX less than one and a positive DTE.  Book 
income exceeds taxable income by the largest margin from 2002 to 2006.  Although 
CashETR has declined through time, the small decrease in CashETR suggests that only a 
portion of these BTDs is due to tax avoidance activities. 
Table 3 presents the underlying data for many of the figures discussed above.  
Table 3 also presents the number of firm-year observations in each year from 1989 to 
2006 that have sufficient financial and press release data for later forecast error tests.  
From 1989 to 1992, there are approximately 400 or fewer observations in each year.  In 
the subsequent years, there are generally 500 or more observations per year. 
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Chapter 8: Multivariate Results – Disclosure of BTDs 
8.1. Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures – Full Earnings Release 
To identify the determinants of BTD disclosures in earnings releases, I estimate 
equation (1) and present the results in Panel A of Table 4.19  In Panel A, the dependent 
variable, BtdDiscFull, equals one if the earnings release contains one or more of the 
primary deferred tax search terms and zero otherwise.  The positive and significant 
coefficients on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE indicate that firms with large positive and 
negative BTDs are more likely than firms with small BTDs to disclose BTD information 
in earnings releases.  I test for differences in the coefficients on LrgPosDTE and 
LrgPosDTE and find no statistical difference.  This result indicates that, in full press 
releases, managers are equally likely to disclose deferred tax information regardless of 
whether firms have large positive or large negative BTDs.   The positive and significant 
coefficients on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE support H1a; the insignificant difference 
between those coefficients provides no support for H1b. 
 The coefficient on AbsDA indicates whether firms with low earnings quality are 
more or less likely to disclose BTD information in earnings releases.  The coefficient on 
AbsDA is insignificant while the coefficient on HighAbsDA is negative but only 
marginally significant.  These results provide weak evidence that firms with lower 
earnings quality (i.e., higher values of AbsDA) are less likely to disclose BTD-related 
information in earnings releases.  Moreover, the insignificant coefficients on 
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE and AbsDA*LrgNegDTE indicate that the association between 
                                                 
19 Table 4 includes two measures of earnings quality and tax avoidance activities.  The earnings quality 
metrics are (1) the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AbsDA) and (2) an indicator variable equal to 
one for firm-year observations in the highest quintile of the absolute value of discretionary accruals in a 
given year and zero otherwise (HighAbsDA).  The tax avoidance metrics are (1) the cash ETR and (2) an 
indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations in the lowest quintile of cash ETRs in a given 
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earnings quality and BTD disclosure does not vary with the sign and size of BTDs.  
Collectively, these results provide only limited evidence that managers are less likely to 
disclose BTD-related information when earnings quality is low.  These results provide 
limited support for H2a and no support for H2b. 
 The coefficients on CashETR and LowCashETR indicate whether firms are more 
or less likely to disclose BTD information as tax avoidance activities increase.  The 
negative and marginally significant (positive and significant) coefficient on CashETR 
(LowCashETR) indicates that firms are more likely to disclose additional BTD 
information in earnings releases when firms have low cash effective tax rates.  These 
results suggest that managers are willing to disclose BTDs when tax avoidance activities, 
rather than earnings management, are the primary source of the difference.  Moreover, 
these results suggest that managers are willing to disclose BTDs when such differences 
may indicate aggressive taxpayer behavior.  Evidence that managers are more likely to 
disclose BTDs when tax avoidance activities are high is inconsistent with H3.  This result 
is consistent, however, with the interpretation that managers are willing to bear potential 
tax-related costs to reassure investors that BTDs are not due to aggressive financial 
reporting. 
The results in Table 4, Panel A also indicate that firms with merger and 
acquisition activity (M&A), firms operating in high tech industries (HighTech), and firms 
with less time elapsing between the fiscal year-end date and the earnings announcement 
date (EarnAnnLag) are more likely to voluntarily disclose BTD information.  The 
positive and significant (negative and significant) coefficient on HighTech (M&A) is 
consistent (inconsistent) with expectations.     
                                                                                                                                                 
year and zero otherwise.  I discuss the results collectively and discuss select results only when results differ 
across specifications. 
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8.2. Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures – Financial Statement 
and Text Components 
 
Prior studies provide evidence that managerial discretion can affect the financial 
statement and text components of earnings releases differently.  Two such studies are 
Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2005) and McGuire (2008).  Bowen et al. investigate 
disclosure of pro forma financial metrics in earnings releases and focus primarily on 
disclosures made in the text of the release.  The authors find that managers emphasize 
metrics that are more value-relevant and that portray more favorable firm performance.  
McGuire (2008) investigates textual disclosure of information pertaining to changes in 
effective tax rates in earnings releases and finds that managers are more likely to 
emphasize decreases in effective tax rates rather than increases in tax rates.  The results 
of these studies suggest that managers can exercise discretion in the text component of 
earnings releases.  These studies stand in contrast to Levi (2008) and Chen et al. (2002) 
that suggest that managers have little discretion when choosing to provide useful 
financial statement information via earnings releases.  Because managerial discretion 
may vary between the financial statement and text components of earnings releases, I 
consider each component separately below. 
8.2.1 Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures – Financial Statement 
Component 
 
To identify the determinants of voluntary BTD disclosures in the financial 
statement component of earnings releases, I estimate equation (1) and present the results 
in Panel B of Table 4.  In Panel B, the dependent variable, BtdDiscFin, equals one if the 
financial statement component of the earnings release contains one or more of the 
primary deferred tax search terms and zero otherwise.  Similar to the full earnings release 
findings, the positive and significant coefficients on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE 
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indicate that firms with large positive and negative BTDs are more likely than firms with 
small BTDs to disclose BTD information in financial statements within earnings releases.  
Unlike the full earnings release findings, however, I find evidence that that the coefficient 
on LrgPosDTE is significantly larger than the coefficient on LrgNegDTE.  The 
differences in the LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE coefficients are significant at the five 
percent level in two specifications and the 10 percent level in the remaining two 
specifications.   The positive and significant coefficients on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE 
support H1a; the significant difference between those coefficients actually runs counter to 
H1b.  The significant difference between LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE is likely due to the 
fact that, on average, large positive BTDs are larger in absolute magnitude than large 
negative BTDs.  Thus, large positive BTDs may be more material and disclosed more 
often in the financial statements. 
 The coefficient on AbsDA is negative but not significant at conventional levels 
while the coefficient on HighAbsDA is negative and significant at the two percent level.  
These results provide some evidence that firms with lower earnings quality (i.e., higher 
values of AbsDA) are less likely to disclose BTD-related information in the financial 
statements of earnings releases.  The insignificant coefficients on AbsDA*LrgPosDTE 
and AbsDA*LrgNegDTE indicate that the association between earnings quality and BTD 
disclosure do not vary with the sign and size of BTDs.  Collectively, these results provide 
some evidence that managers are less likely to disclose BTD-related information when 
earnings quality is low.  These results provide limited support for H2a and no support for 
H2b. 
 Unlike the results for the full releases, the coefficients on CashETR and 
LowCashETR are insignificant, indicating no relationship between tax avoidance 
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activities and disclosure of BTD information in financial statements of earnings releases.  
This result is inconsistent with H2.  The results in Table 4, Panel B also indicate that 
firms operating in high tech industries (HighTech) are more likely to disclose BTD 
information. 
 Overall, these results suggest that the magnitude of BTDs is the most significant 
driver of BTD disclosure in earnings announcement financial statements.   
8.2.2 Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures – Text Component  
To identify the determinants of voluntary BTD disclosures in the text component 
of earnings releases, I estimate equation (1) and present the results in Panel C of Table 4.  
In Panel C, the dependent variable, BtdDiscText, equals one if the text component of the 
earnings release contains one or more of the primary deferred tax search terms and zero 
otherwise.  Similar to the full earnings release findings, the positive and significant 
coefficients on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE indicate that firms with large positive and 
negative BTDs are more likely than firms with small BTDs to disclose BTD information 
in the text of earnings releases.  Unlike the full release and financial statement component 
results, however, I find evidence that that the coefficient on LrgNegDTE is significantly 
larger than the coefficient on LrgPosDTE.  The differences in the LrgNegDTE and 
LrgPosDTE coefficients are significant at the five percent level in two specifications and 
the 10 percent level in the remaining two specifications.   Finding that managers are more 
likely to provide additional emphasis on deferred tax information when they have large 
negative rather than large positive BTDs is interesting given that (1) the large positive 
BTDs are much larger in absolute magnitude than the large negative BTDs and (2) large 
positive BTDs are often seen as potential “red flags” to market participants (Palepu et al. 
2000) that managers may be aggressively reporting book income. 
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 The coefficients on AbsDA and HighAbsDA are both insignificant suggesting that 
there is no direct association between earnings quality and disclosure of deferred tax 
information in the text component of the earnings release.  The insignificant coefficients 
on AbsDA*LrgPosDTE and AbsDA*LrgNegDTE indicate that the association between 
earnings quality and BTD disclosure do not vary with the sign and size of BTDs.  These 
results provide no evidence that managers suppress BTD-related information in the text 
component of the earnings release when earnings quality is low.  These results do not 
support H2a or H2b. 
 Unlike the results for the financial statement component, the coefficient on 
CashETR (LowCashETR) is negative (positive) and highly significant.  These results 
suggest that managers are willing to disclose BTDs when tax avoidance activities, rather 
than earnings management, are the primary source of the difference.  Moreover, these 
results suggest that managers are willing to disclose BTD-related information in the text 
component of earnings releases when such differences may indicate aggressive taxpayer 
behavior.  Evidence that managers are more likely to disclose BTDs when tax avoidance 
activities are high is inconsistent with H3.  As mentioned earlier, this result is consistent 
with the interpretation that managers are willing to bear potential tax-related costs to 
reassure investors that BTDs are not due to aggressive financial reporting.   
The results in Table 4, Panel C also indicate that firms operating in high tech 
industries (HighTech), firms with discontinued operations (DiscOps), firms without 
M&A activities (M&A), firms with prior year losses (PyLoss), and firms with a shorter 
lag between the fiscal year-end and the earnings announcement date (EarnAnnLag) are 
more likely to disclose BTD-related information in the text component of earnings 
releases.  Aside from the M&A result, these results are consistent with expectations. 
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8.3 Determinants of Voluntary BTD-related Disclosures – Summary  
To develop a more thorough understanding of BTD-related disclosure in earnings 
releases, it is useful to evaluate disclosure in the financial statement and text components 
separately.  BTD disclosure in the financial statements appears to be largely driven by the 
magnitude of the BTDs.  Although the magnitude of BTDs also appears to be important 
when managers decide whether to emphasize BTD information in the text of the release, 
managers are more likely to emphasize large negative BTDs than large positive BTDs.  
This result holds despite the fact that large positive BTDs are actually larger in absolute 
magnitude than large negative BTDs.   
There is also evidence that the source of the BTD affects disclosure.  In the 
financial statement component, there is limited evidence that managers are less likely to 
disclose BTD information when book earnings quality is low.  This result suggests that 
managers may avoid disclosing BTD information when aggressive financial reporting 
may be a primary source of the BTD.  In the text component of the release, I find no 
evidence that managers are more or less likely to provide BTD information when 
earnings quality is low.  Although these results are weak, they do run counter to prior 
research suggesting that managers voluntarily disclose financial statement information 
when it is most useful to investors (Chen et al. 2002; Levi 2008).  BTDs are most 
informative as an earnings signal when earnings quality is low, yet managers either 
suppress or are at least no more likely to provide BTD disclosures when earnings quality 
is low. 
Although tax avoidance activities do not affect disclosure of BTD information in 
the financial statement component of the release, managers are more likely to emphasize 
BTD information in the text when tax avoidance activities are a likely source of the 
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difference.  It is difficult to determine whether this result indicates that (1) managers are 
more likely to disclose BTD information when it is less informative about earnings (as is 
the case when tax avoidance activities are high per Ayers et al. 2009), (2) managers use 
BTDs as a signal of efficient tax planning, or (3) managers do not think that market 
participants use BTDs as a signal for aggressive tax planning and are thus simply more 
likely to disclose these differences because they convey no “bad” news to the market. 
Overall, evidence that managers are (1) less likely, or at least no more likely, to 
disclose BTD information when earnings quality is low and (2) more likely to emphasize 
large negative rather than large positive BTDs in the text despite large positive BTDs 
being more material provides some evidence that managers may be selectively disclosing 
BTD information in earnings releases.    
8.4. Disclosure Tests – Economic Significance 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects relating to the disclosure tests.  To simplify 
the presentation of the marginal effects, I present the results for the specification of 
equation (1) that includes HighAbsDA as the earnings quality metric and LowCashETR as 
the tax aggressiveness metric.  I focus on how key variables affect the probability of 
disclosure in the financial statement and text components.  The baseline probability of 
deferred tax disclosure is based a firm that has a small BTD (i.e., LrgPosDTE and 
LrgNegDTE equal zero), has high earnings quality (i.e., HighAbsDA equals zero), has 
low tax avoidance activities (i.e., LowCashETR equals zero), has no NOLs, foreign 
operations, discontinued operations, M&A activity, or prior year loss (i.e., NOL, ForOps, 
DiscOps, M&A, and PyLoss equal zero), and does not operate in a high technology 
industry (i.e., HighTech equals zero). 
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The baseline firm discloses deferred tax information in the financial statement 
component of its press release approximately 16.9 percent of the time.  The probability of 
disclosure increases to 21.4 percent for a firm with a large positive BTD but only to 18.6 
percent for a firm with a large negative BTD.  Low earnings quality (HighAbsDA equals 
one) reduces the probability of disclosure to 14.9 percent.  Finally, a firm operating in a 
high technology industry discloses approximately 21.2 percent of the time.   
The baseline firm discloses deferred tax information in the text component of its 
press release approximately 6.3 percent of the time.  The probability of disclosure 
increases to 8.5 percent for a firm with a large positive BTD and to 10 percent for a firm 
with a large negative BTD.  High tax avoidance activities (LowCashETR equals one) 
increase the probability of disclosure to 8.8 percent.  Finally, a firm operating in a high 
technology industry discloses approximately 8.7 percent of the time. 
These results suggest that firm characteristics considered in equation (1) have a 
large impact on the probability of disclosure.  This is even more apparent as different 
combinations of firm characteristics are considered simultaneously rather than 
considering only one characteristic at a time.   
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Chapter 9: Multivariate Results – Market Effects 
9.1. Forecast Errors 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (2) to benchmark my results 
against prior studies and equation (3) to test H4a.  Panel A replicates the findings in 
Weber (2009) within a sample similar to his; Panel B replicates Weber (2009) in my 
sample consisting of firm-year observations from 1989 to 2006 with press release data 
necessary for my primary analyses.  Consistent with Weber (2009), I find that future 
forecast errors are negatively associated with total accruals (Acc) and positively 
associated with the decile ranking of the ratio of taxable income to book income (rTax), 
firm size (MV), the change in analyst following (∆AFol), and prior period forecast errors 
(PyFE).  These associations are significant regardless of whether month 1 or month 5 
forecast errors are used as the dependent variable. 
To test H4a, I estimate equation (3) in Panel C which incorporates disclosure of 
BTD-related information.  As outlined earlier, BtdDisc equals one when a firm discloses 
BTD-related information in its fourth quarter earnings release and zero when a firm does 
not disclose BTD information.  Consistent with earlier results, I find that future forecast 
errors are negatively associated with total accruals (Acc) and positively associated with 
firm size (MV), the change in analyst following (∆AFol), and prior period forecast errors 
(PyFE).  In equation (3), the positive and significant coefficient on rTax indicates that the 
ratio of taxable to book income is positively associated with future forecast errors for 
non-disclosers.  The negative and significant coefficient on BtdDisc*rTax, however, 
suggests that the association between the ratio of taxable income to book income and 
future forecast errors varies depending on whether a firm discloses BTD information in 
earnings releases.  An F-test indicates that the sum of the coefficients on rTax and 
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BtdDisc*rTax is not significantly different than zero (month 1 forecast error, p-
value=0.2094; month 5 forecast error, p-value=0.4334), suggesting that the ratio of 
taxable to book income is not associated with future forecast errors for disclosers. 
Consistent with H4a, these results suggest that voluntary disclosure of additional BTD 
information in earnings releases help analysts use BTDs when forecasting earnings. 
9.2. Stock Returns 
 Table 7 reports the results from estimating equation (4) to benchmark my results 
against prior studies and equation (5) to test H4b.  Panel A replicates the findings within 
Weber (2009) in a sample similar to his; Panel B replicates Weber (2009) in my sample 
consisting of firm-year observations from 1989 to 2006 with press release data necessary 
for my primary analyses.  In Panel A, I find that future returns are positively associated 
with the decile rankings of the ratio of taxable to book income (rTax), prior period size-
adjusted buy-and-hold returns (SAR), and the earnings to price ratio (EP) and negatively 
associated with the decile rankings of the market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size (MV), and 
total accruals (Acc).  These results are consistent with expectations.  Moreover, the results 
hold regardless of whether all fiscal year-end observations or only December year-end 
observations are used. 
 In Panel B using all fiscal-year end observations, I find that future returns are 
positively associated with the decile rankings of the ratio of taxable to book income 
(rTax) and prior period size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (SAR) and negatively 
associated with the decile rankings of the market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size (MV), and 
total accruals (Acc).  These results are consistent with expectations.  I no longer find an 
association between the earnings to price ratio and future returns.  When the sample is 
restricted to only December fiscal year-end firms in the press release sample, all the 
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results hold except I no longer find an association between the rTax and future returns.  
This result raises the concern that the association between rTax and future returns is not 
robust in all samples and warrants future investigation.  
To test H4b, I estimate equation (5) in Panel C which incorporates disclosure of 
BTD-related information.  The coefficient on the variable of interest, BtdDisc*rTax, is 
not significant at conventional levels, indicating that the association between the ratio of 
taxable to book income (rTax) and future returns is not statistically different across the 
disclosure and non-disclosure samples.  However, an F-test indicates that the sum of rTax 
and BtdDisc*rTax is not statistically different from zero (all fiscal year-ends, p-value = 
0.8127; December year-end, p-value = 0.4879), suggesting that the decile ranking of the 
ratio of taxable to book income is not significantly associated with future returns for 
disclosers.  This result provides limited evidence consistent with H4b that disclosure of 
BTD information in earnings releases helps investors impound the information contained 
in current BTDs into stock prices.  
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Chapter 10: Robustness Checks and Supplemental Analyses 
10.1. Does the Relationship Between Tax Avoidance Activities and BTD Disclosure 
Vary with the Magnitude and Sign of BTDs? 
 
It is possible that the relationship between tax avoidance activities and BTD 
disclosure may vary with the sign and magnitude of the BTD.  To examine this directly, I 
estimate equation (1) including two additional interactions, CashETR*LrgPosDTE and 
CashETR*LrgNegDTE.  The results from estimating these regression specifications are 
presented in Panels A, B, and C of Table 8. 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is BtdDiscFull.  Similar to earlier tests, 
managers are more likely to disclose BTD information when the firm has a large (positive 
or negative) BTD.   The coefficient on CashETR and LowCashETR is insignificant 
indicating the BTD disclosure does not vary with CashETRs for firms with small BTDs.  
When using CashETR to proxy for tax avoidance activities, the negative and significant 
coefficient on CashETR*LrgPosDTE suggests that managers are significantly more likely 
than firms with small BTDs to disclose deferred tax information when tax avoidance 
activities are the likely source of the BTD.  When using LowCashETR to proxy for tax 
avoidance activities, the positive and significant coefficients on 
LowCashETR*LrgPosDTE and LowCashETR*LrgNegDTE suggest that managers are 
more likely to disclose deferred tax information when tax avoidance activities may be a 
significant source of the BTDs.  These results are consistent with managers bearing 
potential tax costs to assure investors that large BTDs are not due to aggressive financial 
reporting. 
In Panels B and C, I investigate whether the full release results are being driven 
by the financial statement or text component of the release.  In Panel B, the dependent 
variable is BtdDiscFin.  In Panel C, the dependent variable is BtdDiscText.  Similar to the 
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results presented in Table 4, the magnitude of the BTD is important in predicting 
financial statement disclosure.  LrgPosDTE is positive and significant in both 
specifications while LrgNegDTE is positive and significant in only one specification.  
Unlike Table 4, however, the coefficients on LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE are not 
significantly different.  The positive and significant coefficient on the 
LowCashETR*LrgPosDTE interaction suggests that the tax avoidance activities results in 
Table 4 may be attributable to firms with positive BTDs driven by tax avoidance 
activities disclosing deferred tax information in earnings releases.  The negative 
coefficient on the CashETR*LrgPosDTE is consistent with this interpretation but this 
coefficient is not significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.11).     
In general, the results pertaining to textual disclosures are similar to those 
presented earlier with one notable exception.  The coefficient on LrgNegDTE is no longer 
significantly larger than the coefficient on LrgPosDTE when LowCashETR is used to 
measure tax avoidance activities.  Considering this result and the positive and highly 
significant coefficient on LowCashETR*LrgNegDTE suggests that the earlier difference 
between LrgPosDTE and LrgNegDTE was driven by firms with large negative BTDs and 
low cash ETRs being much more likely to disclose BTD information in earnings releases.  
Overall, the inferences are similar though.  In general, managers are more willing to 
disclose large negative rather than large positive BTDs, especially when those differences 
are likely due to tax avoidance activities. 
10.2. Alternative Controls for Earnings Quality 
In general, it is difficult to decompose BTDs into components measuring potential 
sources of the differences (i.e., aggressive financial reporting, aggressive tax avoidance 
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activities, or mechanical differences between GAAP and the Internal Revenue Code).20  
Including absolute discretionary accruals and the related interactions in equation (1) is 
one attempt to control for earnings quality when investigating the relationship between 
other variables (such as tax avoidance activities) and BTD disclosure.  In Table 9, I take 
an alternative approach by estimating equation (1) within each absolute discretionary 
accruals (i.e., earnings quality) quintile.  By construction, AbsDA and the related 
interactions are excluded in this regression specification.  Using this approach, I can 
examine how BTD disclosure varies with tax avoidance activities and the sign and size of 
BTDs as earnings quality changes.  The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are 
BtdDiscFull, BtdDiscFin, and BtdDiscText respectively. 
For brevity, I discuss only key results and patterns that emerge in the financial 
statement and text components.  Financial statement disclosures are once again driven by 
the sign and size of the BTD but only in the low earnings quality quintiles (i.e., quintiles 
4 and 5).  This result may be explained by lower earnings quality firms likely having 
larger BTDs.  Similar to results presented earlier, tax avoidance activities do not explain 
financial statement disclosures regardless of the level of earnings quality. 
Regarding text disclosures, managers are more likely to disclose deferred tax 
information in the text component of the release when the firm engages in significant tax 
avoidance activities.  Managers are also more likely to disclose BTD information in the 
text component of the release when the firm has large negative rather than large positive 
BTDs.  This result is consistently significant only in earnings quality quintiles four and 
five (i.e., when earnings quality is low).  Overall, these results suggest that managers are 
                                                 
20 Desai and Dharmapala (2006a) and Seidman (2009) have made attempts at decomposing BTDs but there 
is no generally agreed upon and accepted way of decomposing BTDs.  Note also that many tax avoidance 
measures, such as ETR and cash ETR, often have a financial aggressiveness component because they are 
scaled by reported book earnings (which may be biased when managers report earnings aggressively). 
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(a) willing to bear a tax cost to assure investors that BTDs are not due to aggressive 
financial reporting and (b) less likely to emphasize large positive BTDs that may suggest 
aggressive financial reporting.  These inferences are similar to those from the main 
analysis.    
10.3. Estimating Equation (1) Using Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimating the marginal effects of interaction terms in a logistic regression can be 
problematic unless certain corrections are made (Ai and Norton 2003).  To ensure that the 
statistical significance and the signs of the estimated coefficients and marginal effects in 
equation (1) are valid, I estimate equation (1) using an ordinary least squares regression 
approach.  Panels A, B, and C of Table 10 present the results when using the BtdDiscFull, 
BtdDiscFin, and BtdDiscText as the dependent variable.  Although some results are slightly 
weaker, all main inferences still hold.  
10.4. Controlling for the Determinants of the Disclosure Decision 
10.4.1. Two-stage regression methodology 
Equations (3) and (5) treat disclosure as an exogenous effect.  To control for the 
fact that firms self-select into the disclosure and non-disclosure categories, I re-estimate 
equations (3) and (5) using a two-stage regression that accounts for the endogeneity of 
the disclosure decision.   
The sample used in these (untabulated) tests has approximately seven percent 
fewer firm-year observations because all data necessary to estimate equations (1) and (3) 
are necessary to estimate the two-stage regression.  I estimate the baseline and extended 
models to ensure that the general results presented earlier hold in the smaller sample.  
The results are unchanged.  All significant coefficients for control variables are consistent 
with expectations.  I find a positive association between future forecast errors and the 
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decile ranking of the ratio of taxable income to book income (rTax).  In the baseline 
model, this result indicates that in general there as a positive association between forecast 
errors and BTDs.  In the extended model, this result indicates that there is a positive 
association between forecast errors and BTDs for non-disclosers.  When BTD disclosure 
is considered in the extended model, the coefficient on the BtdDisc*rTax interaction is 
negative and significant, and the sum of rTax and BtdDisc*rTax is not significantly 
different from zero.  These results indicate that future forecast errors are not associated 
with BTDs for disclosers. 
The results from the two-stage regressions are generally consistent with those 
presented earlier.  One interesting result is that the BtdDisc*rTax interaction is only 
marginally significant when month 1 forecast errors are used as the dependent variable.  
The BtdDisc*rTax interaction is highly significant when month 5 forecast error is used as 
the dependent variable.  These results may suggest that disclosure in earnings releases 
draws attention to BTDs but analysts cannot fully utilize the information until complete 
BTD information is disclosed in the annual report.  Regardless of the dependent variable, 
however, the sum of rTax and BtdDisc*rTax is not significantly different from zero. 
The sample used to estimate the stock return two-stage regression has 
approximately 20 percent fewer firm-year observations because all data necessary to 
estimate equations (1) and (5) are necessary to estimate the two-stage regression.  I first 
estimate the baseline and extended models to ensure that the general results presented 
earlier hold in the smaller sample.  The results are unchanged.  All significant coefficients 
on control variables are consistent with expectations.  I also still find a positive and 
significant association between the decile ranking of the ratio of taxable income to book 
income (rTax) and future returns when using all fiscal year-end firms.  When BTD 
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disclosure is considered in the extended model, the coefficient on the BtdDisc*rTax 
interaction is insignificant but the sum of rTax and BtdDisc*rTax is not significantly 
different from zero.  These results are similar to those presented earlier and suggest that, 
although there is no significant difference between the association of rTax and future 
returns across the disclosure and non-disclosure samples, there is no significant 
association between rTax and future returns for disclosers. 
The results from the stock return two-stage regression are generally consistent 
with those presented earlier.  Once again, the association between the ratio of taxable to 
book income and future stock returns for non-disclosers is also positive and significant 
when all fiscal year-end observations are used.  The coefficient on the BtdDisc*rTax 
interaction is not significant, and the sum of rTax and BtdDisc*rTax is not significantly 
different from zero.  Similar to the initial analyses, these results provide limited evidence 
that BTD disclosures help investors use BTDs.  Also similar to earlier results, I do not 
find an association between the rTax and future returns when using only December year-
end firms.  This result continues to raise concerns that the association between rTax and 
future returns is not robust in all samples. 
10.4.2. Propensity score methodology 
As an alternative to a two-stage regression approach, I also match firms based on 
propensity scores using the methodology developed in Leven and Sianesi (2003) and re-
estimate the forecast error tests.  This methodology relies on estimating a logistic model 
to compute the predicted probability that a firm will disclose deferred tax information 
(i.e., the firm’s propensity score) given certain firm characteristics.  Each discloser is 
matched with the firm with the closest propensity score.21 
                                                 
21 I use all variables that load significantly in equation (1), including year and industry fixed effects, to 
develop the propensity score.  Matches are made without replacement. 
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Table 11 presents the results from re-estimating equation (1) after matching 
observations based on propensity scores.  The results are unchanged.  All significant 
coefficients on control variables are consistent with expectations.  I still find a positive 
and significant association between the decile ranking of the ratio of taxable income to 
book income (rTax) and future forecast errors.  The coefficient on BtdDisc*rTax is 
negative and significant and the sum of rTax and BtdDisc*rTax is not significantly 
different from zero.  These results suggest that disclosing BTD information in earnings 
releases help analysts understand and use BTD information. 
10.5. Calendar-time Portfolio Returns Tests 
As an alternative method to test whether mispricing exists for disclosers and non-
disclosers, I use a calendar-time portfolio approach to measure the abnormal returns of a 
BTD-based hedge portfolio.  I construct the calendar-time hedge portfolio as follows: a 
firm enters the sample four months after its fiscal year-end and remains in the sample for 
twelve months.  In each month, all firms in the monthly sample are ranked into quintiles 
based on their most recent fiscal year-end ratio of taxable income to book income (TAX).  
Firms in the highest quintile each month are purchased and held for the month while 
firms in the lowest quintile are sold short for the month.   The portfolio is liquidated on 
April 30th, 2007.  In the equation that follows, I regress the monthly portfolio returns on 
the three factors introduced by Fama and French (1993): 
Rp,t = αp + bp(Rm,t – Rf,t) + spSMBt  + hpHMLt + εp,t, (6)
 
where the three factors are zero-investment portfolios representing (1) the excess return 
of the market, (Rm,t – Rf,t), (2) the difference between a portfolio of small stocks and big 
stocks, SMB, and (3) the difference between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks 
and low book-to-market stocks, HML.  The intercept, αp, measures the average monthly 
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abnormal return on the portfolio, which is assumed to be zero under the hypothesis of no 
abnormal performance.  In this framework, the intercept measures mispricing.         
Table 12 reports the results from estimating several specifications of equation (6).  
Panel A forms portfolios based on all firms in the press release returns sample from 1989 
to 2006.  Panel B partitions the press release sample into disclosers and non-disclosers 
and repeats the analysis for each group separately.  In Panel A, αp is insignificant 
indicating that a BTD-based hedge portfolio does not yield abnormal returns when 
disclosers and non-disclosers are aggregated in a single sample.  In Panel B, αp is positive 
and significant, albeit marginally, for non-disclosers and insignificant for disclosers.  This 
result is consistent with BTD mispricing existing only within the subset of firms that does 
not disclose BTD information in earnings releases.  More importantly, this result is 
consistent with earlier returns tests and suggests that BTD disclosure in earnings releases 
helps investors impound BTD information into stock prices. 
10.6. Conference Call Disclosures 
In supplemental analyses, I investigate the determinants of BTD disclosure in 
conference calls, paying particular attention to how disclosures made via earnings 
releases affect the information content of conference calls.  Examining BTD disclosures 
in conference calls is important for two reasons.  First, it is important to understand the 
relationship between earnings release and conference call disclosures.  The primary 
analyses in this study assume that earnings announcement BTD disclosures highlight the 
importance of BTDs and draw market participants’ attention to BTDs.  Moreover, the 
discloser versus non-discloser classifications assume that disclosers highlight BTD 
information and non-disclosers do not.  This may not be a valid assumption if managers 
use earnings announcement and conference call disclosures as substitutes.   
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Second, this and prior voluntary disclosure studies investigating the disclosure of 
financial statement information in earnings releases assume that managers respond to 
investor demand by providing financial statement information that is useful to investors 
in assessing firm value.  Earlier in the study, I provided evidence that managers do not 
provide additional BTD information when earnings quality is low, a setting in which 
BTDs are likely to be particularly informative to the market.  It is difficult to conclude 
that managers are actively choosing not to provide this information without evidence that 
investors actually demand BTD information.  This is a substantial concern with BTDs 
because BTDs are complex signals that contain information about earnings quality, tax 
avoidance activities, earnings effects due to changes in financial accounting standards, 
and taxable income effects due to tax law changes.  By investigating the determinants of 
BTD disclosure in conference calls, especially in the question and answer component of 
the call, I can provide direct evidence concerning when analysts elicit BTD information 
from managers.      
To identify the determinants of BTD disclosure, I estimate various specifications 
of the following logistic regression: 
CcDisci,t = 
αind + αyear + β1BtdDisck,i,t + β2LrgPosDTEi,t + β3LrgNegDTEi,t  + 
β4AbsDAi,t + β5CashETRi,t + β6AbsDAi,t*LrgPosDTEi,t + 
β7AbsDAi,t*LrgNegDTEi,t + β8NOLi,t + β9ForOpsi,t + β10DiscOpsi,t + 
β11M&Ai,t + β12HighTechi,t + β13PyLossi,t + β14Agei,t + β15MBi,t + 
β16MVi,t + β17AFoli,t + β18RetVoli,t + β19AbsFErri,t + β20EarnAnnLagi,t 
+ εi,t, 
(7)
   
In the initial specification, CcDisci,t equals one if firm i’s fourth quarter earnings 
conference call at the end of year t includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  
These results are reported in Table 13, Panel A.  I then split the conference call into the 
question and answer (Q&A) and management discussion components and re-estimate 
equation (7) for each component.  These results are reported in Panels B and C of Table 
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13.  In Panel B (Panel C), CcDisci,t equals one the if the Q&A component (management 
discussion component) of firm i’s fourth quarter earnings conference call at the end of 
year t includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  In each panel, I also 
estimate the logistic regression (a) without BtdDisc, (b) with BtdDiscFull, (c) with 
BtdDiscFin, and (d) with BtdDiscText.  All other variables are the same as previously 
defined.   
 Table 13, Panel A reports the results from estimating equation (7) where the 
dependent variable, CcDisc, is based on the full conference call transcript.  In all 
specifications, conference calls are more likely to contain BTD-related information when 
firms have large (positive or negative) BTDs.  Interestingly, in three of the four 
specifications, firms with large negative BTDs are significantly more likely to disclose 
BTD-related information in their conference calls than firms with large positive BTDs.  
This result is similar to the disclosure of BTD-related information in the text component 
of earnings releases and suggests that managers are more willing to emphasize large 
negative BTDs than large positive BTDs.  This is surprising given that the large positive 
BTDs are larger in absolute magnitude in my sample than the large negative BTDs.  Also 
similar to the earnings release disclosures, firms are more likely to disclose deferred tax 
information when tax avoidance activities are a likely source of the difference.  Firms 
with net operating losses (NOL) and prior year losses (PyLoss) are also more likely to 
disclose BTD information in conference calls.  I also find no evidence that managers are 
more likely to disclose BTD-related information in conference calls when earnings 
quality is low (i.e., when AbsDA is high).  One final result of note is that BtdDiscFull is 
positive and significant, suggesting that conference calls are more likely to contain BTD 
information when the press release contained BTD information.  Specifications (3) and 
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(4) provide evidence that textual earnings release disclosures are more likely to result in 
additional BTD information in conference calls than financial statement earnings release 
disclosures.   
Collectively, the results in Panel A suggest that managers are more likely to 
disclose BTD information when the BTDs are less likely to be driven by aggressive 
financial reporting.  The results also indicate that managers use earnings release and 
conference call disclosures as complements rather than substitutes.  Interestingly, it also 
appears that analysts do not elicit BTD information from managers when earnings quality 
is low.  To investigate this more directly, I next look at disclosure of BTD information in 
the Q&A and management discussion components of conference calls separately. 
 Table 13, Panel B reports the results from estimating equation (7) where the 
dependent variable, CcDisc, is based on only the Q&A component of the conference call.    
In all specifications, conference calls are more likely to contain BTD-related information 
when firms have large BTDs but analysts are no more likely to ask about BTDs when 
firms have large positive BTDs than when firms have large negative BTDs.  The 
coefficient on AbsDA (and the related interactions) are not significant at conventional 
levels, indicating that analysts are not more likely to ask questions about BTDs when 
earnings quality is low.  The positive (negative) and significant coefficient on NOL 
(CashETR) indicates that analysts are more likely to ask about BTDs when firms have net 
operating losses (when firms engage in significant tax avoidance activities).  Analysts 
also appear to follow-up on BTD information disclosed in the text of the earnings release 
(BtdDiscText) rather than asking about BTD information if it was not disclosed or only 
disclosed in the financial statement component of the earnings release.  Overall, the 
results indicate that analysts (1) ask questions about BTDs when firms have low Cash 
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ETRs or net operating losses, (2) do not ask questions when firms have low earnings 
quality, and (3) do not ask any more questions about large positive BTDs than large 
negative BTDs.  Collectively, these results suggest that analysts may view BTDs as a 
signal about tax avoidance activities but not necessarily as a signal about earnings 
quality.   
Table 13, Panel C reports the results from estimating equation (7) where the 
dependent variable, CcDisc, is based on the management discussion component of the 
conference call.  In all specifications, conference calls are more likely to contain BTD-
related information when firms have large (positive or negative) BTDs.  Interestingly, 
managers are significantly more likely to discuss BTD information in the management 
discussion component of the call when firms have large negative BTDs than when firms 
have large positive BTDs.  The results also indicate that managers are willing to disclose 
BTD information when tax avoidance activities are a likely source of the BTDs and when 
they already disclosed BTD information in the text component of the release.  Overall, 
these results suggest that managers are unlikely to disclose any additional BTD 
information in conference calls unless the source of the differences is likely due to tax 
avoidance activities.   
Collectively, the results suggest that managers are more likely to (1) emphasize 
large negative rather than large positive BTDs, (2) discuss BTD information that was 
already discussed in the earnings announcement, and (3) disclose BTD information when 
taxes, rather than aggressive financial reporting, are the likely source of the BTD.  The 
results also suggest that analysts (1) primarily follow-up on information already disclosed 
in the earnings release and (2) consider BTDs as a stronger signal of tax avoidance 
activities rather than financial reporting quality.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion 
In this study, I examine two research questions.  First, what are the determinants 
of voluntary BTD disclosures in earnings announcements?  Second, do voluntary BTD 
disclosures help analysts and investors impound BTD information into earnings forecasts 
and stock prices?  Using earnings releases from 1989 to 2006, I find (1) that managers are 
more likely to disclose BTD information in earnings releases when tax avoidance 
activities are the likely source of the difference, (2) that managers are more likely to 
disclose large negative rather than large positive BTDs, and (3) limited evidence that 
managers are less likely to disclose BTD information when earnings quality is low.  In 
general, I find similar patterns of disclosure within subsequent conference calls.   
These results provide some evidence of selective disclosure of BTD information 
by managers but provide stronger evidence that managers are willing to bear some tax-
related disclosure costs in order to reassure investors that BTDs are due to tax avoidance 
activities rather than aggressive financial reporting.  
Evaluating the market effects of the BTD disclosures, I find that voluntary BTD 
disclosures attenuate the association between BTDs and future forecast errors.  I provide 
limited evidence that BTD disclosures attenuate the association between BTDs and future 
stock returns.  Collectively, these results suggest that voluntary BTD disclosures help 
analysts and investors understand and use BTDs. 
This study contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure of accounting 
information in earnings releases.  Prior studies find that managers voluntarily disclose 
basic financial information in earnings releases, even when the disclosures help market 
participants unwind the discretionary component of reported earnings (Levi 2008).  
Selective disclosure of BTD information suggests that tax-related disclosures are affected 
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by a unique set of costs that change the pattern of disclosure.  This study suggests that 
tax-related disclosures differ from other basic financial disclosures.   
This study also contributes to the literature investigating analysts’ and investors’ 
use of BTD information.  Finding that voluntary BTD disclosures attenuate the 
association between future analyst forecast errors and BTDs provides evidence that 
focused disclosures of BTD information help analysts fulfill their integral role as 
information intermediaries.  The weaker evidence regarding whether BTD disclosures 








Panel A: Disclosure Tests      
       
Data Restrictions Data Range N Purpose Eq. Tbl. 
Initial press release sample 1989-2006 220,127     
Less firm-year observations:      
 
Where Factiva release date does not 
match Compustat or I/B/E/S fourth 
quarter earnings announcement date 1989-2006 (186,704)    
 
Without necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, 
and CRSP-based disclosure variables 1989-2006 (15,879)    
Final Disclosure Sample 1989-2006 17,544  Disclosure test (1) 4 
Panel B: Forecast Error Tests      
       
Data Restrictions Data Range N Purpose Eq. Tbl. 
Initial firms with necessary Compustat 
and      
 I/B/E/S data for forecast error tests 1985-2006 22,391     
       
Require Month 1 Forecast Error 1985-2006 19,905  Benchmark test (2) 6 
Less firm-year observations:      
 Beginning prior to 1989 1989-2006 (2,626)    
 Without press release data 1989-2006 (6,604)    
   10,675  Single-stage test (3) 6 
 
Without necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, 
and CRSP-based disclosure variables 1989-2006 (754)    
   9,921  Two-stage test   
       
Require Month 1 Forecast Error 1985-2006 15,327  Benchmark test (2) 6 
Less firm-year observations:      
 Beginning prior to 1989 1989-2006 (2,427)    
 Without press release data 1989-2006 (5,130)    
   7,770  Single-stage test (3) 6 
 
Without necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, 
and CRSP-based disclosure variables 1989-2006 (530)    
      7,240  Two-stage test    
Panel C: Buy-and-Hold Stock Return Tests     
       
Data Restrictions Data Range N Purpose Eq. Tbl. 
Initial firms with necessary CRSP and      
  Compustat data for basic return tests 1985-2006 52,978  Benchmark test (4) 7 
Less firm-year observations:      
  Beginning prior to 1989 1989-2006 (8,913)    
  Without press release data 1989-2006 (24,298)    
Single-stage returns sample  19,767  Single-stage test (5) 7 
 
Without necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, 
and CRSP-based disclosure variables 1989-2006 (3,929)    












observations)   
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Diff. 
Basic Descriptives 
TA 2,820.55  693.06   3,092.32 824.99   2,652.34  611.52   ** 
MktCap 3,595.49  894.78   3,847.07 1,077.01  3,439.77  777.51   * 
ROA 0.078  0.068   0.080  0.069   0.076  0.067   *** 
Disclosure Test Variables 
DTE 0.002  0.001   0.003  0.002   0.001  0.001   *** 
DA 0.019  0.007   0.021  0.007   0.019  0.007     
AbsDA 0.135  0.058   0.163  0.068   0.117  0.053   *** 
ETR 0.276  0.289   0.263  0.277   0.284  0.295   *** 
CashETR 0.280  0.277   0.256  0.252   0.295  0.294   *** 
NOL 0.225  0.000   0.281  0.000   0.191  0.000   *** 
M&A 0.245  0.000   0.248  0.000   0.244  0.000     
HighTech 0.240 0.000   0.277 0.000   0.217 0.000   *** 
DiscOps 0.089 0.000   0.108 0.000   0.077 0.000   *** 
ForOps 0.471 0.000   0.493 0.000   0.458 0.000   *** 
AFolt 12.319  10.000   12.516  10.000   12.197  10.000   * 
Age 19.487  14.000   19.891  14.000   19.236  14.000   * 
Loss 0.074  0.000   0.087  0.000   0.067  0.000   *** 
RetVol 0.026  0.024   0.026  0.024   0.026  0.024     
EarnAnnLag 37.892  37.000   37.601  36.000   38.072  37.000    
Market Effects Test Variables 
FErrt+1 (0.010) (0.002)  (0.008) (0.001)  (0.011) (0.002)  *** 
BtdDiscFull 0.382 0.000   1.000 1.000   0.000 0.000   *** 
BtdDiscFin 0.288 0.000   0.753 1.000   0.000 0.000   *** 
BtdDiscText 0.120 0.000   0.315 0.000   0.000 0.000   *** 
TAX 0.905  0.874   0.852  0.828   0.938  0.901   *** 
Size 6.855  6.797   7.055  6.982   6.732  6.656   *** 
MB 3.120  2.482   3.205  2.530   3.067  2.461   *** 
∆AFolt+1 0.061  0.000   0.079  0.000   0.049  0.000   *** 
PyFErr (0.002) 0.000   (0.001) 0.000   (0.002) (0.000)  *** 
Acc (0.030) (0.034)   (0.033) (0.034)   (0.029) (0.034)   *** 
***, **, * denote differences in means between the disclosure and non-disclosure samples at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively.  See Appendix A for additional information about variable construction. 
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Variable 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Basic Descriptives
N 275 431 438 412 506 584 636 647 689 625 601 539 521 480 625 682 699 531
WordCount 821      859      864      972      976      1,040   1,096   1,191   1,298   1,436   1,635   2,021   2,140   2,478   2,812   3,037   3,276   3,481   
BTD Measures
TAX 0.941 0.994 1.019 0.980 0.987 0.966 0.949 0.971 0.945 1.022 0.985 0.922 0.924 0.761 0.696 0.702 0.774 0.882
DTE 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.001
BTD Information in Press Releases
Full 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8%
Financials 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6%
Text 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2%
Primary Deferred Tax Information in Press Releases
Full 13.1% 13.2% 16.0% 19.9% 23.5% 25.0% 27.7% 28.7% 30.3% 30.1% 35.9% 44.2% 44.7% 50.2% 58.7% 61.4% 65.2% 66.7%
Financials 1.8% 1.4% 2.5% 2.9% 4.0% 5.0% 8.8% 17.6% 17.4% 18.4% 35.4% 43.4% 44.1% 31.0% 57.9% 58.8% 62.4% 64.4%
Text 12.0% 12.1% 13.5% 17.7% 20.8% 22.1% 20.6% 12.7% 15.4% 13.9% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 20.2% 4.6% 7.9% 10.0% 10.2%
Secondary Deferred Tax Information in Press Releases
Full 0.7% 1.4% 0.7% 0.5% 1.8% 1.7% 1.1% 1.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.8% 2.8% 1.5% 4.0% 5.1% 8.8% 15.0% 13.6%
Financials 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.6% 1.0% 1.7% 0.8% 0.8% 3.0% 3.7% 7.9% 6.6%
Text 0.7% 1.4% 0.7% 0.2% 1.8% 1.7% 0.8% 1.4% 0.7% 0.6% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 3.1% 3.2% 6.2% 10.2% 10.4%
ETR Measure
ETR 0.297 0.300 0.313 0.303 0.294 0.290 0.291 0.288 0.281 0.286 0.289 0.277 0.270 0.240 0.224 0.231 0.257 0.274
ETR Information in Press Releases
Full 6.5% 6.5% 6.4% 5.6% 4.9% 6.5% 7.5% 7.4% 6.0% 6.2% 6.8% 8.5% 9.6% 12.9% 18.1% 20.5% 24.5% 25.8%
Financials 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 1.1% 1.5% 1.0% 1.1% 1.5% 4.3% 3.8% 2.7% 6.6% 6.9% 8.3% 11.3%
Text 6.5% 6.5% 6.2% 5.3% 4.5% 6.3% 6.8% 6.2% 4.9% 5.6% 5.3% 5.4% 6.1% 10.6% 13.3% 15.2% 18.9% 19.2%
Cash ETR Measure
CashETR 0.347 0.331 0.345 0.319 0.318 0.312 0.308 0.297 0.284 0.290 0.290 0.256 0.273 0.222 0.209 0.212 0.238 0.272
Cash ETR Information in Press Releases
Full 0.4% 0.7% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.9% 4.2% 3.8% 5.1% 5.3% 6.2%
Financials 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 3.0% 3.7% 3.7% 5.1%
Text 0.4% 0.7% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 1.2% 3.1% 1.4% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4%
Earnings Quality Measures
Acc -0.026 -0.033 -0.034 -0.029 -0.025 -0.021 -0.016 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.030 -0.031 -0.053 -0.047 -0.041 -0.034 -0.033 -0.025
AbsDA 0.064 0.082 0.080 0.061 0.083 0.077 0.077 0.129 0.074 0.105 0.089 0.116 0.199 0.162 0.304 0.215 0.221 0.183
DA -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.010 -0.005 0.011 0.008 0.065 0.000 -0.007 0.028 0.018 0.039 0.060 -0.019 0.073 0.048 0.000
See Appendix A for variable defintions and Appendix B for search terms and categories.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Trends by Year
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Table 4 
Determinants of Book-Tax Difference-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps 
+ β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel A: Full Press Release (N = 17,544) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
LrgPosDTE + 0.2926 (<0.0001)  0.2936 (<0.0001)  0.2958 (<0.0001)  0.2964 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.2564 (<0.0001)  0.2487 (<0.0001)  0.2344 (<0.0001)  0.2264 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA - -0.0754 (0.2400)  -0.0767 (0.2370)       
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0285 (0.8660)  0.0270 (0.8730)       
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.1075 (0.5570)  0.1086 (0.5530)       
HighAbsDA -       -0.0861 (0.0860)  -0.0885 (0.0805) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?       0.0086 (0.9410)  0.0083 (0.9430) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?       0.1664 (0.1140)  0.1690 (0.1080) 
CashETR + -0.1820 (0.0785)     -0.1804 (0.0805)    
LowCashETR -    0.1015 (0.0470)     0.1023 (0.0460) 
NOL + -0.0600 (0.1975)  -0.0631 (0.1860)  -0.0595 (0.1990)  -0.0628 (0.1875) 
ForOps + -0.0595 (0.2290)  -0.0582 (0.2345)  -0.0599 (0.2280)  -0.0585 (0.2330) 
DiscOps + -0.0082 (0.4605)  -0.0140 (0.4325)  -0.0082 (0.4605)  -0.0139 (0.4330) 
M&A + -0.1061 (0.0225)  -0.1046 (0.0240)  -0.1060 (0.0230)  -0.1045 (0.0245) 
HighTech + 0.3760 (0.0025)  0.3755 (0.0025)  0.3767 (0.0025)  0.3761 (0.0025) 
PyLoss ? 0.0443 (0.4830)  0.0341 (0.5860)  0.0449 (0.4770)  0.0343 (0.5840) 
Age ? -0.0030 (0.2540)  -0.0031 (0.2490)  -0.0031 (0.2480)  -0.0031 (0.2420) 
MB ? -0.0092 (0.4880)  -0.0089 (0.5010)  -0.0091 (0.4890)  -0.0088 (0.5020) 
MV ? 0.0517 (0.2030)  0.0541 (0.1830)  0.0518 (0.2030)  0.0542 (0.1830) 
Afol ? 0.0020 (0.7500)  0.0018 (0.7680)  0.0019 (0.7570)  0.0018 (0.7760) 
RetVol ? -0.3941 (0.8940)  -0.5786 (0.8450)  -0.3814 (0.8970)  -0.5681 (0.8470) 
AbsFErr ? -0.0959 (0.1580)  -0.1062 (0.1170)  -0.0955 (0.1590)  -0.1059 (0.1180) 
EarnAnnLag ? -0.0056 (0.0280)  -0.0056 (0.0270)  -0.0056 (0.0280)  -0.0056 (0.0270) 
             
Χ2-test of β1=β2:  0.21 (p = 0.6431)  0.33 (p = 0.5652)  0.66 (p = 0.4156)  0.86 (p = 0.3546) 
Χ2-test of β4=β5:  0.14 (p = 0.7078)  0.15 (p = 0.6987)  1.38 (p = 0.2406)  1.43 (p = 0.2323) 
Pseudo R2   0.1406   0.1407   0.1407   0.1408 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Difference-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps 
+ β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel B: Financial Statement Component Only (N = 17,544) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
LrgPosDTE + 0.2708 (<0.0001)  0.2769 (<0.0001)  0.2849 (<0.0001)  0.2907 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.1271 (0.0305)  0.1235 (0.0335)  0.1175 (0.0355)  0.1143 (0.0385) 
AbsDA - -0.1244 (0.1415)  -0.1244 (0.1415)       
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0966 (0.5750)  0.0980 (0.5690)       
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.1967 (0.2950)  0.1981 (0.2920)       
HighAbsDA -       -0.1538 (0.0185)  -0.1539 (0.0185) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?       0.0203 (0.8750)  0.0208 (0.8720) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?       0.1975 (0.1020)  0.1977 (0.1020) 
CashETR + -0.0484 (0.3650)     -0.0466 (0.3700)    
LowCashETR -    -0.0148 (0.4125)     -0.0130 (0.4235) 
NOL + -0.0898 (0.1170)  -0.0873 (0.1245)  -0.0889 (0.1190)  -0.0866 (0.1260) 
ForOps + -0.1064 (0.1075)  -0.1064 (0.1075)  -0.1073 (0.1055)  -0.1073 (0.1055) 
DiscOps + -0.0449 (0.2980)  -0.0457 (0.2940)  -0.0452 (0.2965)  -0.0461 (0.2925) 
M&A + -0.0523 (0.1795)  -0.0524 (0.1790)  -0.0511 (0.1850)  -0.0512 (0.1850) 
HighTech + 0.2764 (0.0265)  0.2796 (0.0250)  0.2752 (0.0265)  0.2782 (0.0255) 
PyLoss ? -0.0578 (0.4210)  -0.0503 (0.4800)  -0.0565 (0.4310)  -0.0496 (0.4860) 
Age ? -0.0028 (0.2930)  -0.0028 (0.2910)  -0.0028 (0.2840)  -0.0028 (0.2810) 
MB ? -0.0027 (0.8420)  -0.0023 (0.8660)  -0.0024 (0.8590)  -0.0020 (0.8810) 
MV ? 0.0537 (0.2000)  0.0536 (0.2020)  0.0536 (0.2010)  0.0535 (0.2030) 
Afol ? -0.0042 (0.5100)  -0.0041 (0.5150)  -0.0042 (0.5050)  -0.0042 (0.5090) 
RetVol ? 2.9237 (0.3490)  3.0315 (0.3310)  3.0291 (0.3320)  3.1286 (0.3160) 
AbsFErr ? -0.1533 (0.0580)  -0.1536 (0.0570)  -0.1534 (0.0580)  -0.1538 (0.0560) 
EarnAnnLag ? -0.0034 (0.2210)  -0.0034 (0.2160)  -0.0034 (0.2260)  -0.0034 (0.2220) 
             
Χ2-test of β1=β2:  2.73 (p = 0.0982)  3.19 (p = 0.0741)  3.95 (p = 0.047)  4.51 (p = 0.0337) 
Χ2-test of β4=β5:  0.23 (p = 0.6318)  0.23 (p = 0.6324)  1.5 (p = 0.2203)  1.5 (p = 0.2211) 
Pseudo R2   0.2576   0.2576   0.2578   0.2578 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps 
+ β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel C: Text Component Only (N = 17,544) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
LrgPosDTE + 0.2860 (<0.0001)  0.2957 (<0.0001)  0.3190 (<0.0001)  0.3288 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.4976 (<0.0001)  0.4617 (<0.0001)  0.5384 (<0.0001)  0.5011 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA - 0.0970 (0.2795)  0.0895 (0.2945)       
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.1612 (0.5200)  0.1556 (0.5360)       
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.3837 (0.1120)  0.3937 (0.1000)       
HighAbsDA -       0.0918 (0.1530)  0.0849 (0.1710) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?       -0.0524 (0.7370)  -0.0573 (0.7140) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?       0.0749 (0.5940)  0.0868 (0.5350) 
CashETR + -0.7983 (<0.0001)     -0.8013 (<0.0001)    
LowCashETR -    0.3618 (<0.0001)     0.3634 (<0.0001) 
NOL + 0.0534 (0.2485)  0.0414 (0.2990)  0.0519 (0.2545)  0.0398 (0.3060) 
ForOps + 0.0506 (0.2805)  0.0505 (0.2810)  0.0504 (0.2815)  0.0500 (0.2825) 
DiscOps + 0.1713 (0.0455)  0.1450 (0.0765)  0.1700 (0.0470)  0.1435 (0.0785) 
M&A + -0.1803 (0.0055)  -0.1759 (0.0065)  -0.1798 (0.0060)  -0.1754 (0.0070) 
HighTech + 0.3565 (0.0040)  0.3565 (0.0035)  0.3536 (0.0040)  0.3538 (0.0040) 
PyLoss ? 0.2984 (<0.0001)  0.2711 (<0.0001)  0.3013 (<0.0001)  0.2737 (<0.0001) 
Age ? -0.0028 (0.3780)  -0.0030 (0.3410)  -0.0028 (0.3780)  -0.0030 (0.3400) 
MB ? -0.0148 (0.3250)  -0.0128 (0.3870)  -0.0146 (0.3340)  -0.0126 (0.3980) 
MV ? 0.0155 (0.7390)  0.0257 (0.5800)  0.0138 (0.7660)  0.0242 (0.6030) 
Afol ? 0.0063 (0.3400)  0.0058 (0.3840)  0.0066 (0.3180)  0.0061 (0.3600) 
RetVol ? -4.5281 (0.2440)  -4.8348 (0.2140)  -4.7641 (0.2210)  -5.0761 (0.1930) 
AbsFErr ? 0.0651 (0.4490)  0.0312 (0.7160)  0.0641 (0.4560)  0.0302 (0.7260) 
EarnAnnLag ? -0.0052 (0.0500)  -0.0054 (0.0430)  -0.0051 (0.0570)  -0.0052 (0.0480) 
             
Χ2-test of β1=β2:  4.55 (p = 0.033)  2.85 (p = 0.0916)  5.05 (p = 0.0247)  3.16 (p = 0.0753) 
Χ2-test of β4=β5:  0.69 (p = 0.4064)  0.79 (p = 0.3737)  0.53 (p = 0.4654)  0.68 (p = 0.4084) 
Pseudo R2   0.0891   0.0894   0.0888   0.0891 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + 
β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1).  The dependent variable is either BtdDiscFull (Panel A), BtdDiscFin (Panel B), or BtdDiscText 
(Panel C).  These variables equal one for firm-year observations if the firm's fourth quarter earnings announcement (or earnings announcement component) 
includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  See Appendix A for all other variable definitions.  p-values are based on one-tailed test statistics 
when predictions are made for variables.  All p-values are based on Huber-White, cluster-adjusted (by firm) standard errors.    
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Variable Pred. Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx
LrgPosDTE + 0.2964 *** 0.0658 0.2907 *** 0.0449 0.3288 *** 0.0224
LrgNegDTE + 0.2264 *** 0.0497 0.1143 ** 0.0167 0.5011 *** 0.0368
HighAbsDA - -0.0885 * -0.0183 -0.1539 ** -0.0206 0.0849 0.0052
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0083 0.0017 0.0208 0.0030 -0.0573 -0.0033
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.1690 0.0367 0.1977 0.0297 0.0868 0.0053
LowCashETR - 0.1023 ** 0.0220 -0.0130 -0.0018 0.3634 *** 0.0251
NOL + -0.0628 -0.0130 -0.0866 -0.0118 0.0398 0.0024
ForOps + -0.0585 -0.0122 -0.1073 -0.0146 0.0500 0.0030
DiscOps + -0.0139 -0.0029 -0.0461 -0.0064 0.1435 * 0.0090
M&A + -0.1045 ** -0.0215 -0.0512 -0.0071 -0.1754 *** -0.0096
HighTech + 0.3761 *** 0.0845 0.2782 ** 0.0428 0.3538 *** 0.0243
PyLoss ? 0.0343 0.0073 -0.0496 -0.0069 0.2737 *** 0.0182
Age ? -0.0031 -0.0007 -0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0002
MB ? -0.0088 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0126 -0.0007
MV ? 0.0542 0.0114 0.0535 0.0075 0.0242 0.0014
Afol ? 0.0018 0.0004 -0.0042 -0.0006 0.0061 0.0004
RetVol ? -0.5681 -0.1196 3.1286 0.4401 -5.0761 -0.2987
AbsFErr ? -0.1059 -0.0218 -0.1538 * -0.0206 0.0302 0.0018
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0056 ** -0.0012 -0.0034 -0.0005 -0.0052 ** -0.0003
Χ 2 -test of β1=β2: 0.86 (p = 0.3546) 4.51 (p = 0.0337) 3.16 (p = 0.0753)
Χ 2 -test of β4=β5: 1.43 (p = 0.2323) 1.5 (p = 0.2211) 0.68 (p = 0.4084)
Pseudo R2 0.1408 0.2578 0.0891
This table presents select results and marginal effects from estimating equation (1).  The dependent variable is either BtdDisc Full , BtdDisc Fin , or 
BtdDisc Text .  These variables equal one for firm-year observations if the firm's fourth quarter earnings announcement (or earnings announcement 
component) includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  See Appendix A for all other variable definitions.  p -values are based on one-tailed 
test statistics when predictions are made for variables.  All p -values are based on Huber-White, cluster-adjusted (by firm) standard errors.   
Table 5
Marginal Effects of the Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3HighAbsDA + β4HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE + β5HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6LowCashETR + 
β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + 
β19EarnAnnLag + ε
Financial Statement Full Release Text Component
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Table 6 
Effect of BTD Disclosure on the Relationship between the Ratio of Taxable to Book Income and 
Analyst Forecast Errors 
FErrt+1 = αind + αyear + β1rTax + β2BtdDisc + β3MV + β4MB + β5∆AFolt+1  + β6PyFE + β7Acc + 
β8BtdDisc*rTax + ε 
Panel A: Baseline Model, Unrestricted Sample (1985-2006)    
    FErrt+1 (Month 1)  FErrt+1 (Month 5) 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0071 (<0.0001)  0.0054 (<0.0001) 
MV  +  0.0037 (<0.0001)  0.0024 (<0.0001) 
MB  +  0.0000 (0.3490)  0.0000 (0.2080) 
∆AFolt+1  +  0.0083 (<0.0001)  0.0048 (<0.0001) 
PyFE  +  0.5210 (<0.0001)  0.3373 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.0407 (<0.0001)  -0.0270 (<0.0001) 
         
Adj R2    0.1637  0.1273 
N       19,905    15,327  
Panel B: Baseline Model, Press Release Sample (1989-2006)    
    FErrt+1 (Month 1)  FErrt+1 (Month 5) 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0047 (<0.0001)  0.0041 (<0.0001) 
MV  +  0.0032 (<0.0001)  0.0021 (<0.0001) 
MB  +  0.0000 (0.4880)  0.0000 (0.3185) 
∆AFolt+1  +  0.0081 (<0.0001)  0.0056 (<0.0001) 
PyFE  +  0.5455 (<0.0001)  0.3268 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.0317 (<0.0001)  -0.0228 (<0.0001) 
         
Adj R2    0.1554  0.109 
N       10,675    7,770  
Panel C: Extended Model, Press Release Sample (1989-2006)    
    FErrt+1 (Month 1)  FErrt+1 (Month 5) 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0062 (<0.0001)  0.0058 (<0.0001) 
BtdDisc  ?  0.0018 (0.2050)  0.0020 (0.1080) 
MV  +  0.0032 (<0.0001)  0.0021 (<0.0001) 
MB  +  0.0000 (0.4750)  0.0000 (0.3185) 
∆AFolt+1  +  0.0081 (<0.0001)  0.0056 (<0.0001) 
PyFE  +  0.5451 (<0.0001)  0.3264 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.0318 (<0.0001)  -0.0229 (<0.0001) 
BtdDisc*rTax  -  -0.0039 (0.0440)  -0.0045 (0.0165) 
         
F-test of β1 + β8 = 0    1.58  (p = 0.2094)  0.61  (p = 0.4334) 
Adj R2    0.1558  0.1098 
N       10,675    7,770  
This table presents the results from estimating equations (2) and (3).  The dependent variable, FErri,t+1, 
equals firm i’s actual t+1 earnings minus the month 1 (or month 5) consensus forecast of those earnings, 
scaled by month 1 stock price.  Firm and time subscripts have been omitted.  All variables are firm-
specific at the end of year t unless specified otherwise.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Year and 
industry fixed effects have been included in the regression.  p-values are based on Huber-White, cluster-
adjusted (by firm) standard errors and on one-tailed test statistics when predictions are made.    
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Table 7 
Effect of BTD Disclosure on the Relationship between the Ratio of Taxable to Book Income and  
Returns 
SARt+1=αind+αyear+β1rTax+β2BtdDisc+β3MV+β4MB+β5Beta+β6EP+β7SAR+β8Acc+β9BtdDisc*rTax+ε 
Panel A: Baseline Model, Unrestricted Sample 
    All FYE: 1985-2006  Dec FYE: 1985-2006 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0549 (<0.0001)  0.0505 (<0.0001) 
MV  -  -0.0348 (0.0010)  -0.0456 (0.0015) 
MB  -  -0.0697 (<0.0001)  -0.0670 (<0.0001) 
Beta  +  0.0179 (0.0605)  0.0264 (0.0305) 
EP  +  0.0622 (<0.0001)  0.0611 (<0.0001) 
SAR  +  0.0878 (<0.0001)  0.1010 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.1246 (<0.0001)  -0.0926 (<0.0001) 
         
Adj R2    0.0169  0.0199  
N       52,978   29,568 
Panel B: Baseline Model, Press Release Sample 
    All FYE: 1989-2006  Dec FYE: 1989-2006 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0281 (0.0215)  0.0010 (0.4775) 
MV  -  -0.0476 (0.0005)  -0.0632 (<0.0001) 
MB  -  -0.0559 (<0.0001)  -0.0585 (0.0005) 
Beta  +  0.0239 (0.0565)  0.0418 (0.0135) 
EP  +  0.0071 (0.3060)  0.0056 (0.3780) 
SAR  +  0.0630 (<0.0001)  0.0685 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.0936 (<0.0001)  -0.0716 (<0.0001) 
         
Adj R2    0.0227  0.0274  
N       19,779   11,391 
Panel C: Extended Model, Press Release Sample 
    All FYE: 1989-2006  Dec FYE: 1989-2006 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0415 (0.0080)  0.0137 (0.2625) 
BtdDisc  ?  0.0373 (0.0145)  0.0277 (0.1105) 
MV  -  -0.0494 (<0.0001)  -0.0637 (<0.0001) 
MB  -  -0.0554 (<0.0001)  -0.0583 (0.0005) 
Beta  +  0.0222 (0.0645)  0.0405 (0.0160) 
EP  +  0.0069 (0.3105)  0.0053 (0.3850) 
SAR  +  0.0630 (<0.0001)  0.0689 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.0932 (<0.0001)  -0.0714 (<0.0001) 
BtdDisc*rTax  -  -0.0361 (0.0970)  -0.0338 (0.1740) 
         
F-test of β1 + β9 = 0          0.06  (p = 0.8127)        0.48  (p = 0.4879) 
Adj R2    0.0230  0.0276  
N       19,779   11,391 
The dependent variable, SARi,t+1, equals firm i’s size-adjusted annual buy-hold return starting four months 
after the end of fiscal year t, calculated as the raw annual return minus the corresponding size decile 
portfolio return. Variables are firm-specific at the end of year t unless specified otherwise. Year and 
industry fixed effects are included. See Appendix A for variable definitions. p-values are based on Huber-




Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases with Cash 
ETR Interactions 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE + β6CashETR + β7CashETR*LrgPosDTE + β8CashETR*LrgNegDTE + β9NOL + 
β10ForOps + β11DiscOps + β12M&A + β13HighTech + β14PyLoss + β15Age + β16MB + β17MV + β18AFol + 
β19RetVol + β20AbsFErr + β21EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel A: Full Press Release 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
LrgPosDTE + 0.4192 (<0.0001)  0.2171 (0.0010) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.3542 (<0.0001)  0.1456 (0.0080) 
AbsDA - -0.0660 (0.2680)    
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0025 (0.9880)    
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.0886 (0.6290)    
HighAbsDA -    -0.0771 (0.1110) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?    -0.0081 (0.9440) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?    0.1399 (0.1830) 
CashETR + -0.0022 (0.4945)    
CashETR*LrgPosDTE ? -0.5802 (0.0710)    
CashETR*LrgNegDTE ? -0.3204 (0.1810)    
LowCashETR -    -0.1020 (0.1010) 
LowCashETR*LrgPosDTE ?    0.3452 (0.0020) 
LowCashETR*LrgNegDTE ?    0.5338 (<0.0001) 
NOL + -0.0601 (0.1970)  -0.0644 (0.1820) 
ForOps + -0.0573 (0.2380)  -0.0548 (0.2475) 
DiscOps + -0.0070 (0.4660)  -0.0080 (0.4615) 
M&A + -0.1059 (0.0230)  -0.1072 (0.0215) 
HighTech + 0.3767 (0.0025)  0.3801 (0.0025) 
PyLoss ? 0.0458 (0.4690)  0.0434 (0.4900) 
Age ? -0.0030 (0.2600)  -0.0032 (0.2360) 
MB ? -0.0091 (0.4910)  -0.0088 (0.5040) 
MV ? 0.0517 (0.2040)  0.0548 (0.1790) 
Afol ? 0.0020 (0.7530)  0.0017 (0.7850) 
RetVol ? -0.3634 (0.9020)  -0.5141 (0.8620) 
AbsFErr ? -0.0957 (0.1580)  -0.1025 (0.1300) 
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0056 (0.0270)  -0.0056 (0.0270) 
       
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
       
Χ2-test of β1=β2:  (0.5775)   (0.3909)  
Χ2-test of β3+β4=0:  (0.6518)   (0.3888)  
Χ2-test of β3+β5=0:  (0.8862)   (0.4901)  
Χ2-test of β4=β5:  (0.6849)   (0.2712)  
Χ2-test of β6+β7=0:  (0.0525)   (0.0078)  
Χ2-test of β6+β8=0:  (0.1213)   (0.0003)  
Χ2-test of β7=β8:  (0.4551)   (0.1867)  
       
Pseudo R2  0.1408   0.1419  




Table 8 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases with Cash 
ETR Interactions 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE + β6CashETR + β7CashETR*LrgPosDTE + β8CashETR*LrgNegDTE + β9NOL + 
β10ForOps + β11DiscOps + β12M&A + β13HighTech + β14PyLoss + β15Age + β16MB + β17MV + β18AFol + 
β19RetVol + β20AbsFErr + β21EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel B: Financial Statement Component Only 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
LrgPosDTE + 0.3935 (<0.0001)  0.1770 (0.0100) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.2120 (0.0245)  0.0537 (0.2140) 
AbsDA - -0.1169 (0.1565)    
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0742 (0.6680)    
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.1828 (0.3310)    
HighAbsDA -    -0.1434 (0.0255) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?    -0.0002 (0.9990) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?    0.1769 (0.1430) 
CashETR + 0.1236 (0.2370)    
CashETR*LrgPosDTE ? -0.5993 (0.1110)    
CashETR*LrgNegDTE ? -0.2928 (0.2670)    
LowCashETR -    -0.2327 (0.0050) 
LowCashETR*LrgPosDTE ?    0.4638 (<0.0001) 
LowCashETR*LrgNegDTE ?    0.3880 (0.0060) 
NOL + -0.0906 (0.1150)  -0.0905 (0.1165) 
ForOps + -0.1036 (0.1140)  -0.1024 (0.1165) 
DiscOps + -0.0440 (0.3015)  -0.0392 (0.3215) 
M&A + -0.0518 (0.1815)  -0.0524 (0.1795) 
HighTech + 0.2771 (0.0260)  0.2834 (0.0235) 
PyLoss ? -0.0568 (0.4280)  -0.0372 (0.6020) 
Age ? -0.0027 (0.2980)  -0.0029 (0.2730) 
MB ? -0.0026 (0.8470)  -0.0011 (0.9330) 
MV ? 0.0537 (0.2010)  0.0526 (0.2120) 
Afol ? -0.0042 (0.5100)  -0.0040 (0.5280) 
RetVol ? 2.9576 (0.3430)  3.3055 (0.2890) 
AbsFErr ? -0.1523 (0.0590)  -0.1459 (0.0710) 
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0034 (0.2160)  -0.0034 (0.2160) 
       
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
       
Χ2-test of β1=β2:  (0.1540)   (0.1765)  
Χ2-test of β3+β4=0:  (0.7523)   (0.1737)  
Χ2-test of β3+β5=0:  (0.6808)   (0.7418)  
Χ2-test of β4=β5:  (0.6043)   (0.2210)  
Χ2-test of β6+β7=0:  (0.1821)   (0.0258)  
Χ2-test of β6+β8=0:  (0.4508)   (0.2161)  
Χ2-test of β7=β8:  (0.4492)   (0.6248)  
       
Pseudo R2  0.2578   0.2587  
N   17,544     17,544   
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Table 8 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases with Cash 
ETR Interactions 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE + β6CashETR + β7CashETR*LrgPosDTE + β8CashETR*LrgNegDTE + β9NOL + 
β10ForOps + β11DiscOps + β12M&A + β13HighTech + β14PyLoss + β15Age + β16MB + β17MV + β18AFol + 
β19RetVol + β20AbsFErr + β21EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel C: Text Component Only 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
LrgPosDTE + 0.3767 (0.0010)  0.3580 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.8083 (<0.0001)  0.3310 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA - 0.1218 (0.2310)    
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.1420 (0.5720)    
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.3060 (0.2090)    
HighAbsDA -    0.0993 (0.1335) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?    -0.0592 (0.7040) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?    0.0309 (0.8270) 
CashETR + -0.3902 (0.0460)    
CashETR*LrgPosDTE ? -0.3004 (0.4970)    
CashETR*LrgNegDTE ? -1.0194 (0.0080)    
LowCashETR -    0.1612 (0.0555) 
LowCashETR*LrgPosDTE ?    0.0170 (0.9040) 
LowCashETR*LrgNegDTE ?    0.8857 (<0.0001) 
NOL + 0.0566 (0.2360)  0.0372 (0.3185) 
ForOps + 0.0556 (0.2620)  0.0577 (0.2540) 
DiscOps + 0.1751 (0.0425)  0.1480 (0.0725) 
M&A + -0.1829 (0.0050)  -0.1814 (0.0055) 
HighTech + 0.3561 (0.0040)  0.3620 (0.0035) 
PyLoss ? 0.3077 (<0.0001)  0.2769 (<0.0001) 
Age ? -0.0027 (0.3840)  -0.0031 (0.3180) 
MB ? -0.0158 (0.2970)  -0.0150 (0.3200) 
MV ? 0.0144 (0.7560)  0.0275 (0.5560) 
Afol ? 0.0062 (0.3510)  0.0055 (0.4080) 
RetVol ? -4.5684 (0.2420)  -5.4712 (0.1660) 
AbsFErr ? 0.0598 (0.4870)  0.0217 (0.8020) 
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0052 (0.0490)  -0.0052 (0.0510) 
       
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
       
Χ2-test of β1=β2:  (0.0068)   (0.7981)  
Χ2-test of β3+β4=0:  (0.1913)   (0.7630)  
Χ2-test of β3+β5=0:  (0.0262)   (0.2583)  
Χ2-test of β4=β5:  (0.5484)   (0.6079)  
Χ2-test of β6+β7=0:  (0.0787)   (0.1119)  
Χ2-test of β6+β8=0:  (<0.0001)   (<0.0001)  
Χ2-test of β7=β8:  (0.1498)   (<0.0001)  
       
Pseudo R2  0.0900   0.0923  
N   17,512     17,512   
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Table 8 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases with Cash 
ETR Interactions 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE + β6CashETR + β7CashETR*LrgPosDTE + β8CashETR*LrgNegDTE + β9NOL + 
β10ForOps + β11DiscOps + β12M&A + β13HighTech + β14PyLoss + β15Age + β16MB + β17MV + β18AFol + 
β19RetVol + β20AbsFErr + β21EarnAnnLag + ε 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1) with additional CashETR interaction terms.  
The dependent variable is either BtdDiscFull (Panel A), BtdDiscFin (Panel B), or BtdDiscText (Panel C).  
These variables equal one for firm-year observations if the firm's fourth quarter earnings announcement (or 
earnings announcement component) includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  See Appendix 
A for all other variable definitions.  p-values are based on one-tailed test statistics when predictions are 
made for variables.  All p-values are based on Huber-White, cluster-adjusted (by firm) standard errors.    
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Variable Pred. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
LrgPosDTE + 0.1918 * 0.1972 * 0.2295 ** 0.2336 ** 0.2930 ** 0.2888 ** 0.4149 *** 0.4013 *** 0.3330 *** 0.3051 ***
LrgNegDTE + 0.3852 *** 0.3603 *** 0.1444 0.1345 0.1823 * 0.1778 * 0.2689 *** 0.2662 *** 0.3707 *** 0.3778 ***
CashETR + -0.4462 ** -0.2310 -0.2184 -0.1063 0.0239
LowCashETR - 0.1908 * 0.1124 0.1622 * 0.1533 * 0.1825 *
NOL + -0.0239 -0.0308 0.0174 0.0162 0.0138 0.0110 -0.0911 -0.1044 -0.2420 ** -0.2588 **
ForOps + 0.0154 0.0184 0.0487 0.0479 -0.1905 * -0.1857 * -0.0196 -0.0170 -0.1229 -0.1261
DiscOps + -0.2082 * -0.2164 * -0.1441 -0.1492 0.1462 0.1352 0.0020 -0.0029 0.1875 0.1926 *
M&A + -0.0100 -0.0078 -0.2088 ** -0.2086 ** -0.1285 -0.1241 -0.0511 -0.0476 -0.1010 -0.1047
HighTech + 0.2772 0.2827 0.3305 * 0.3318 * 0.5519 *** 0.5440 *** 0.3274 ** 0.3191 ** 0.3586 ** 0.3405 **
PyLoss ? 0.2298 * 0.2093 -0.0419 -0.0566 0.0563 0.0375 -0.0123 -0.0419 0.0025 -0.0379
Age ? -0.0063 -0.0063 0.0006 0.0005 0.0043 0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0091 ** -0.0090 **
MB ? -0.0464 * -0.0449 * 0.0112 0.0118 0.0216 0.0216 -0.0212 -0.0219 -0.0123 -0.0139
MV ? -0.0613 -0.0549 0.1078 * 0.1106 * 0.0223 0.0263 0.0025 0.0048 0.1093 * 0.1125 *
Afol ? 0.0264 ** 0.0259 ** -0.0114 -0.0115 -0.0099 -0.0100 0.0081 0.0081 0.0069 0.0067
RetVol ? -14.7111 ** -14.7398 ** -3.5820 -3.7727 0.9972 0.7631 2.1404 1.7733 3.3064 2.7596
AbsFErr ? -0.3774 ** -0.3890 ** -0.1218 -0.1342 -0.0926 -0.1070 0.0424 0.0323 -0.0407 -0.0455
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0077 ** -0.0078 ** -0.0110 *** -0.0109 ***
Χ 2 -test of β 1 =β 2 : (0.1809) (0.2525) (0.5544) (0.4829) (0.4389) (0.4310) (0.2610) (0.2883) (0.7876) (0.5970)
Pseudo R2 0.1670 0.1670 0.1436 0.1436 0.1731 0.1734 0.1512 0.1516 0.1370 0.1376
N 3,496 3,496 3,500 3,500 3,494 3,494 3,468 3,468 3,481 3,481
Table 9
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases by Earnings Quality Quintiles
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β4CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV 
+ β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε
Panel A: Full Press Release
Absolute Discretionary Accruals Quintiles
Q1 Q4 Q5Q2 Q3
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Variable Pred. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
LrgPosDTE + 0.2070 0.2285 * 0.2012 0.2091 0.2371 * 0.2577 ** 0.4550 *** 0.4295 *** 0.3660 *** 0.3353 ***
LrgNegDTE + 0.2448 ** 0.2331 ** -0.0442 -0.0563 0.0664 0.0603 0.1568 0.1601 * 0.3306 *** 0.3398 ***
CashETR + -0.1528 -0.2646 -0.0640 0.0213 0.1627
LowCashETR - -0.0388 0.1000 -0.0872 0.1689 * 0.0980
NOL + -0.1114 -0.1033 0.0103 0.0121 0.0943 0.0987 -0.1847 * -0.2053 ** -0.2826 ** -0.2926 **
ForOps + 0.0484 0.0482 0.0800 0.0793 -0.2586 ** -0.2611 ** -0.1325 -0.1268 -0.2071 * -0.2104 *
DiscOps + -0.2881 ** -0.2879 ** -0.1406 -0.1446 -0.0086 -0.0100 0.0419 0.0400 0.1552 0.1618
M&A + 0.0906 0.0884 -0.0476 -0.0476 -0.2175 ** -0.2216 ** -0.0140 -0.0100 -0.0637 -0.0690
HighTech + -0.0055 0.0038 0.5313 ** 0.5349 ** 0.4164 ** 0.4276 ** 0.3035 * 0.2928 * 0.1509 0.1337
PyLoss ? 0.2637 * 0.2808 * -0.0678 -0.0762 -0.1956 -0.1692 -0.1713 -0.2150 -0.0839 -0.1176
Age ? -0.0077 * -0.0076 * -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0080 ** 0.0080 ** -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0099 ** -0.0098 **
MB ? -0.0294 -0.0287 0.0077 0.0086 0.0142 0.0152 -0.0075 -0.0097 0.0003 -0.0014
MV ? -0.0063 -0.0068 0.1422 ** 0.1455 ** 0.0311 0.0290 -0.0110 -0.0103 0.0598 0.0620
Afol ? 0.0086 0.0087 -0.0139 -0.0140 -0.0148 -0.0146 0.0019 0.0019 0.0054 0.0052
RetVol ? -7.9709 -7.5327 -2.1991 -2.2186 6.9598 7.2819 2.0607 1.5148 5.6846 5.3574
AbsFErr ? -0.4909 ** -0.4912 ** -0.0402 -0.0530 -0.2262 -0.2206 0.0779 0.0641 -0.1589 -0.1506
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0035 0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0079 * -0.0079 * -0.0089 ** -0.0087 **
Χ 2 -test of β 1 =β 2 : (0.8241) (0.9782) (0.1602) (0.1193) (0.3044) (0.2203) (0.0520) (0.0702) (0.8120) (0.9754)
Pseudo R2 0.2865 0.2865 0.2636 0.2636 0.2869 0.2870 0.2698 0.2702 0.2565 0.2565
N 3,496 3,496 3,494 3,494 3,494 3,494 3,462 3,462 3,432 3,432
Panel B: Financial Statements Only
Q5
Table 9 (continued)
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases by Earnings Quality Quintiles
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β4CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV 
+ β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Absolute Discretionary Accruals Quintiles
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Variable Pred. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
LrgPosDTE + 0.3561 ** 0.3561 ** 0.1698 0.1924 0.4725 *** 0.4507 *** 0.2621 * 0.2910 * 0.2368 0.2463 *
LrgNegDTE + 0.6697 *** 0.6112 *** 0.5452 *** 0.5070 *** 0.4194 *** 0.4173 *** 0.6395 *** 0.5945 *** 0.6215 *** 0.6046 ***
CashETR + -1.1656 *** -0.7763 ** -0.6179 * -0.7763 ** -0.7115 **
LowCashETR - 0.5819 *** 0.2874 ** 0.4825 *** 0.2455 ** 0.3502 ***
NOL + 0.2385 * 0.1996 -0.1102 -0.1158 -0.1313 -0.1427 0.1183 0.1109 0.0693 0.0521
ForOps + -0.0409 -0.0438 0.0308 0.0290 0.0972 0.1054 0.2526 ** 0.2535 ** -0.0374 -0.0450
DiscOps + 0.0210 0.0063 0.1829 0.1679 0.4685 ** 0.4252 ** 0.1751 0.1367 0.1145 0.1018
M&A + -0.3060 ** -0.3050 ** -0.5393 *** -0.5349 *** 0.0952 0.1104 -0.1287 -0.1228 -0.0368 -0.0328
HighTech + 0.5046 ** 0.5009 ** 0.0601 0.0692 0.6116 *** 0.5852 ** 0.0025 0.0001 0.5014 *** 0.4895 ***
PyLoss ? 0.1861 0.1026 0.1438 0.1182 0.6072 *** 0.5492 *** 0.3658 ** 0.3630 ** 0.2003 0.1862
Age ? -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0031 0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0081 -0.0084 -0.0044 -0.0048
MB ? -0.0516 -0.0486 -0.0177 -0.0157 0.0288 0.0287 -0.0387 -0.0357 -0.0038 -0.0027
MV ? -0.1037 -0.0843 0.0373 0.0444 -0.0302 -0.0183 -0.0081 0.0036 0.0859 0.0966
Afol ? 0.0301 ** 0.0295 ** -0.0046 -0.0049 0.0027 0.0021 0.0125 0.0121 0.0009 0.0003
RetVol ? -21.8863 ** -22.2539 *** -4.3798 -4.6426 -9.0224 -9.6948 2.1520 2.7287 -2.4042 -3.0468
AbsFErr ? -0.0106 -0.0283 -0.1420 -0.1747 0.0341 -0.0046 0.1731 0.1598 0.1301 0.0892
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0102 ** -0.0106 **
Χ 2 -test of β 1 =β 2 : (0.1242) (0.1966) (0.0434) (0.0848) (0.7812) (0.8592) (0.0312) (0.0723) (0.0260) (0.0329)
Pseudo R2 0.1349 0.1371 0.1166 0.1161 0.1099 0.1134 0.1020 0.1007 0.0905 0.0910
N 3,400 3,400 3,416 3,416 3,432 3,432 3,411 3,411 3,416 3,416
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1) within earnings quality quintiles.  The dependent variable is either BtdDisc Full  (Panel A), BtdDisc Fin  (Panel B), or 
BtdDisc Text  (Panel C).  These variables equal one for firm-year observations if the firm's fourth quarter earnings announcement (or earnings announcement component) includes BTD-
related information and zero otherwise.  See Appendix A for all other variable definitions.  p -values are based on one-tailed test statistics when predictions are made for variables.  All 
p -values are based on Huber-White, cluster-adjusted (by firm) standard errors.   
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases by Earnings Quality Quintiles
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β4CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + 
β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε
Absolute Discretionary Accruals Quintiles
Table 9 (continued)




Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases: OLS 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + 
β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel A: Full Press Release (N = 17,544) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
Intercept ? 0.0691 (0.5730)  0.0524 (0.6690) 
LrgPosDTE + 0.0554 (<0.0001)  0.0572 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.0478 (<0.0001)  0.0431 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA - -0.0165 (0.2375)    
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0161 (0.6620)    
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.0304 (0.4330)    
HighAbsDA -    -0.0169 (0.0740) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?    0.0027 (0.9030) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?    0.0334 (0.1050) 
CashETR + -0.0340 (0.0760)    
LowCashETR -    0.0196 (0.0460) 
NOL + -0.0109 (0.2190)  -0.0116 (0.2075) 
ForOps + -0.0100 (0.2615)  -0.0099 (0.2625) 
DiscOps + -0.0028 (0.4325)  -0.0039 (0.4070) 
M&A + -0.0201 (0.0255)  -0.0197 (0.0280) 
HighTech + 0.0724 (0.0030)  0.0723 (0.0030) 
PyLoss ? 0.0101 (0.4150)  0.0081 (0.5100) 
Age ? -0.0006 (0.2460)  -0.0006 (0.2330) 
MB ? -0.0016 (0.5350)  -0.0016 (0.5560) 
MV ? 0.0103 (0.1940)  0.0107 (0.1760) 
Afol ? 0.0005 (0.6760)  0.0005 (0.6990) 
RetVol ? 0.0728 (0.8980)  0.0416 (0.9420) 
AbsFErr ? -0.0161 (0.1790)  -0.0179 (0.1330) 
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0011 (0.0250)  -0.0011 (0.0240) 
       
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
       
F-test of β1=β2:  (0.6214)   (0.3431)  
F-test of β4=β5:  (0.7500)   (0.2554)  
       




Table 10 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases: OLS 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + 
β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel B: Financial Statement Component Only (N = 17,544) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
Intercept ? -0.0542 (0.5280)  -0.0571 (0.5050) 
LrgPosDTE + 0.0355 (<0.0001)  0.0408 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.0138 (0.0755)  0.0143 (0.0630) 
AbsDA - -0.0307 (0.0925)    
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0422 (0.2280)    
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.0524 (0.1520)    
HighAbsDA -    -0.0235 (0.0105) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?    0.0069 (0.7210) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?    0.0305 (0.0850) 
CashETR + -0.0062 (0.3740)    
LowCashETR -    -0.0007 (0.4725) 
NOL + -0.0111 (0.1815)  -0.0107 (0.1915) 
ForOps + -0.0128 (0.1560)  -0.0132 (0.1500) 
DiscOps + -0.0108 (0.2265)  -0.0108 (0.2255) 
M&A + -0.0074 (0.1975)  -0.0069 (0.2110) 
HighTech + 0.0366 (0.0400)  0.0369 (0.0385) 
PyLoss ? -0.0055 (0.5980)  -0.0047 (0.6550) 
Age ? -0.0004 (0.2940)  -0.0004 (0.2780) 
MB ? -0.0005 (0.8280)  -0.0003 (0.8750) 
MV ? 0.0089 (0.1620)  0.0088 (0.1630) 
Afol ? -0.0004 (0.6430)  -0.0005 (0.6350) 
RetVol ? 0.5976 (0.1970)  0.6247 (0.1780) 
AbsFErr ? -0.0172 (0.0780)  -0.0173 (0.0760) 
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0005 (0.2060)  -0.0005 (0.2160) 
       
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
       
F-test of β1=β2:  (0.0823)   (0.0289)  
F-test of β4=β5:  (0.8055)   (0.2806)  
       




Table 10 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Earnings Press Releases: OLS 
BtdDisc = αind + αyear + β1LrgPosDTE + β2LrgNegDTE  + β3AbsDA + β4AbsDA*LrgPosDTE + 
β5AbsDA*LrgNegDTE+ β6CashETR + β7NOL + β8ForOps + β9DiscOps + β10M&A + β11HighTech + 
β12PyLoss + β13Age + β14MB + β15MV + β16AFol + β17RetVol + β18AbsFErr + β19EarnAnnLag + ε 
Panel C: Text Component Only (N = 17,544) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
Intercept ? 0.1398 (0.0180)  0.1029 (0.0790) 
LrgPosDTE + 0.0279 (0.0005)  0.0309 (<0.0001) 
LrgNegDTE + 0.0487 (<0.0001)  0.0489 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA - 0.0075 (0.2895)    
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ? 0.0095 (0.7040)    
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ? 0.0481 (0.1000)    
HighAbsDA -    0.0056 (0.2425) 
HighAbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?    -0.0049 (0.7620) 
HighAbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?    0.0165 (0.3030) 
CashETR + -0.0729 (<0.0001)    
LowCashETR -    0.0392 (<0.0001) 
NOL + 0.0042 (0.2925)  0.0028 (0.3600) 
ForOps + 0.0049 (0.2835)  0.0052 (0.2710) 
DiscOps + 0.0152 (0.0665)  0.0126 (0.1050) 
M&A + -0.0171 (0.0040)  -0.0166 (0.0050) 
HighTech + 0.0375 (0.0020)  0.0373 (0.0025) 
PyLoss ? 0.0319 (<0.0001)  0.0283 (0.0010) 
Age ? -0.0003 (0.3580)  -0.0003 (0.3320) 
MB ? -0.0014 (0.3020)  -0.0013 (0.3620) 
MV ? 0.0004 (0.9320)  0.0012 (0.7770) 
Afol ? 0.0008 (0.2730)  0.0007 (0.2990) 
RetVol ? -0.5190 (0.1390)  -0.5921 (0.0930) 
AbsFErr ? 0.0070 (0.4010)  0.0029 (0.7330) 
EarnAnnTimeLag ? -0.0005 (0.0350)  -0.0005 (0.0320) 
       
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
       
F-test of β1=β2:  (0.0690)   (0.0980)  
F-test of β4=β5:  (0.2564)   (0.2936)  
       
Pseudo R2   0.0613      0.0615    
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1) using ordinary least squares regressions.  The 
dependent variable is either BtdDiscFull (Panel A), BtdDiscFin (Panel B), or BtdDiscText (Panel C).  These 
variables equal one for firm-year observations if the firm's fourth quarter earnings announcement (or 
earnings announcement component) includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  See Appendix 
A for all other variable definitions.  p-values are based on one-tailed test statistics when predictions are 




Effect of BTD Disclosure on the Relationship between the Ratio of Taxable to Book Income and 
Analyst Forecast Errors: Propensity Score Matched Sample 
FErrt+1 = αind + αyear + β1rTax + β2BtdDisc + β3MV + β4MB + β5∆AFolt+1  + β6PyFE + β7Acc + 
β8BtdDisc*rTax + ε 
    FErrt+1 (Month 1) 
Variable   Pred.   Coeff. p-value 
rTax  +  0.0070 (0.0050) 
BtdDisc  ?  0.0034 (0.0880) 
MV  +  0.0033 (<0.0001) 
MB  +  0.0008 (<0.0001) 
∆AFolt+1  +  0.0078 (<0.0001) 
PyFE  +  0.4832 (<0.0001) 
Acc  -  -0.0347 (<0.0001) 
BtdDisc*rTax  -  -0.0062 (0.0275) 
      
F-test of β1 + β8 = 0    0.17  (p = 0.6776)  
      
Adj R2    0.1598  
N       5,847    
This table presents the results from estimating equation (3) using a matched sample based on propensity 
scores.  The dependent variable, FErri,t+1, equals firm i’s actual t+1 earnings minus the month 1 consensus 
forecast of those earnings, scaled by month 1 stock price.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  p-
values are based on one-tailed test statistics when predictions are made for variables.  All p-values are 





Returns on a BTD-based Calendar-time Hedge Portfolio 
Panel A: Press Release Benchmark Sample (1989-2006)                     
 αp  (Rm,t – Rf,t)   SMB  HML  N  Adj R2 
All Firms 0.0009     -0.0169    -0.0945 **   -0.0142     210   0.022008 
                
                
Panel B: Press Release Benchmark Sample (1989-2006), Disclosers vs. Non-Disclosers           
 αp  (Rm,t – Rf,t)   SMB  HML  N  Adj R2 
Disclosers -0.0011    0.0790   -0.0975 *  0.0320    203  0.010621 
Non-Disclosers 0.0025 *   -0.0421    -0.0982 **   -0.0338    203   0.0218851 
In this table, calendar-time hedge portfolios are based on purchasing firms each month in the highest quintiles of the ratio of taxable income to book 
income (TAX) and selling short firms each month in the lowest quintile.  Firms enter the sample four months after fiscal year-end and remain in the sample 
for twelve months.  The portfolio is liquidated on April 30th, 2007.  The abnormal portfolio returns are regressed on the Fama and French (1993) three 
factors in the following regression: Rp,t = αp + bp(Rm,t – Rf,t) + spSMBt  + hpHMLt + εp,t.  The intercept, αp, measures the average monthly abnormal return 





Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Conference Calls 
Panel A: Full Conference Call Transcript (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Variable Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
BtdDiscFull ?     0.7284 (<0.0001)       
BtdDiscFin ?        0.2083 (0.1000)    
BtdDiscText ?           2.2325 (<0.0001) 
LrgPosDTE +  0.5010 (0.0005)  0.4745 (0.0015)  0.4913 (0.0010)  0.5127 (0.0010) 
LrgNegDTE +  0.9366 (<0.0001)  0.8819 (<0.0001)  0.9249 (<0.0001)  0.8004 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA ?  0.1213 (0.2960)  0.1299 (0.2805)  0.1252 (0.2890)  0.1392 (0.2835) 
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?  0.1730 (0.5880)  0.2038 (0.5200)  0.1740 (0.5840)  0.1042 (0.3785) 
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?  -0.1514 (0.6810)  -0.1511 (0.6850)  -0.1642 (0.6560)  -0.3001 (0.2240) 
CashETR +  -1.4994 (0.0005)  -1.4517 (0.0005)  -1.4936 (0.0005)  -1.0083 (0.0055) 
NOL +  0.2730 (0.0175)  0.2780 (0.0165)  0.2758 (0.0170)  0.2037 (0.0635) 
ForOps +  0.0871 (0.2760)  0.1055 (0.2360)  0.0934 (0.2615)  0.0146 (0.4620) 
DiscOps +  0.1440 (0.1590)  0.1633 (0.1280)  0.1507 (0.1475)  0.1573 (0.1400) 
M&A +  -0.0949 (0.2345)  -0.0911 (0.2455)  -0.0946 (0.2360)  -0.0632 (0.3225) 
HighTech +  -0.2657 (0.1045)  -0.2970 (0.0830)  -0.2756 (0.0970)  -0.2262 (0.1405) 
PyLoss ?  0.3681 (0.0160)  0.3953 (0.0090)  0.3771 (0.0130)  0.2780 (0.0870) 
Age ?  0.0011 (0.7950)  0.0009 (0.8310)  0.0010 (0.8040)  0.0001 (0.9790) 
MB ?  -0.0259 (0.3680)  -0.0252 (0.3880)  -0.0259 (0.3690)  -0.0189 (0.5090) 
MV ?  -0.1019 (0.2270)  -0.0994 (0.2360)  -0.1010 (0.2310)  -0.0886 (0.3140) 
Afol ?  -0.0007 (0.9540)  -0.0021 (0.8570)  -0.0010 (0.9300)  -0.0045 (0.7010) 
RetVol ?  0.0136 (0.9990)  0.3002 (0.9740)  0.3788 (0.9670)  -6.3964 (0.5260) 
EarnAnnLag ?  -0.0028 (0.5850)  -0.0028 (0.6000)  -0.0028 (0.5950)  -0.0026 (0.6440) 
              
Χ2-test of β2=β3:   4.92 (p = 0.0266)  4.18 (p = 0.0408)  4.83 (p = 0.0279)  2.05 (p = 0.1523) 
Χ2-test of β5=β6:   0.78 (p = 0.3769)  0.9 (p = 0.3418)  0.84 (p = 0.3581)  1.05 (p = 0.3055) 
              
Pseudo R2   0.0762  0.0905  0.0775  0.1737 
N     3,281    3,281    3,281    3,281  
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Table 13 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Conference Calls 
Panel B: Question and Answer 
Component (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Variable Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
BtdDiscFull ?     0.4182 (0.0210)       
BtdDiscFin ?        0.0410 (0.8150)    
BtdDiscText ?           0.9842 (<0.0001) 
LrgPosDTE +  0.4968 (0.0210)  0.4855 (0.0240)  0.4954 (0.0215)  0.4991 (0.0215) 
LrgNegDTE +  0.4914 (0.0275)  0.4522 (0.0405)  0.4886 (0.0285)  0.4240 (0.0495) 
AbsDA +  0.4056 (0.0925)  0.3981 (0.0965)  0.4041 (0.0925)  0.4426 (0.0795) 
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?  -0.1601 (0.7240)  -0.1196 (0.7910)  -0.1568 (0.7290)  -0.1888 (0.6800) 
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?  0.2227 (0.6660)  0.2333 (0.6530)  0.2219 (0.6680)  0.1304 (0.7950) 
CashETR +  -1.8669 (0.0015)  -1.8160 (0.0020)  -1.8642 (0.0015)  -1.5984 (0.0040) 
NOL +  0.3363 (0.0335)  0.3401 (0.0320)  0.3370 (0.0335)  0.3030 (0.0475) 
ForOps +  0.1341 (0.2485)  0.1416 (0.2360)  0.1349 (0.2475)  0.1209 (0.2750) 
DiscOps +  0.0036 (0.4930)  0.0140 (0.4730)  0.0049 (0.4905)  0.0127 (0.4755) 
M&A +  -0.0977 (0.3040)  -0.1065 (0.2890)  -0.0985 (0.3025)  -0.0795 (0.3380) 
HighTech +  -0.9217 (0.0010)  -0.9476 (0.0005)  -0.9245 (0.0005)  -0.8939 (0.0010) 
PyLoss ?  0.1962 (0.4040)  0.2112 (0.3640)  0.1976 (0.4000)  0.1553 (0.5100) 
Age ?  -0.0003 (0.9530)  -0.0002 (0.9720)  -0.0003 (0.9560)  -0.0002 (0.9650) 
MB ?  -0.0061 (0.8630)  -0.0067 (0.8500)  -0.0062 (0.8610)  -0.0033 (0.9250) 
MV ?  0.0106 (0.9310)  0.0112 (0.9260)  0.0107 (0.9300)  0.0081 (0.9480) 
Afol ?  -0.0078 (0.6170)  -0.0081 (0.6010)  -0.0078 (0.6160)  -0.0083 (0.5990) 
RetVol ?  12.8207 (0.3570)  12.7414 (0.3590)  12.8956 (0.3550)  10.3521 (0.4630) 
EarnAnnLag ?  -0.0083 (0.2400)  -0.0084 (0.2350)  -0.0083 (0.2390)  -0.0085 (0.2340) 
              
Χ2-test of β2=β3:   0 (p = 0.9857)  0.01 (p = 0.9125)  0 (p = 0.9822)  0.06 (p = 0.8019) 
Χ2-test of β5=β6:   0.46 (p = 0.4955)  0.39 (p = 0.5343)  0.45 (p = 0.5011)  0.35 (p = 0.5558) 
              
Pseudo R2   0.0823  0.0865  0.0823  0.0986 
N     3,103    3,103    3,103    3,103  
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Table 13 (continued) 
Determinants of Book-Tax Differences-related Disclosures in Conference Calls 
Panel C: Management Discussion 
Component (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Variable Pred.   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
BtdDiscFull ?     0.8449 (<0.0001)       
BtdDiscFin ?        0.1880 (0.2060)    
BtdDiscText ?           2.6816 (<0.0001) 
LrgPosDTE +  0.4559 (0.0075)  0.4196 (0.0290)  0.4456 (0.0095)  0.4446 (0.0155) 
LrgNegDTE +  1.0395 (<0.0001)  0.9675 (<0.0001)  1.0267 (<0.0001)  0.8543 (<0.0001) 
AbsDA -  -0.0123 (0.4820)  0.0082 (0.9750)  -0.0031 (0.4955)  -0.0791 (0.3920) 
AbsDA*LrgPosDTE ?  0.1849 (0.6110)  0.2022 (0.5760)  0.1793 (0.6200)  0.1042 (0.7920) 
AbsDA*LrgNegDTE ?  -0.0380 (0.9280)  -0.0387 (0.9260)  -0.0519 (0.9010)  -0.1917 (0.6760) 
CashETR +  -1.4260 (0.0030)  -1.3418 (0.0080)  -1.4163 (0.0030)  -0.7316 (0.0440) 
NOL +  0.2463 (0.0540)  0.2530 (0.1030)  0.2484 (0.0530)  0.1476 (0.1825) 
ForOps +  0.0674 (0.3490)  0.0866 (0.6190)  0.0728 (0.3375)  -0.0371 (0.4210) 
DiscOps +  0.2005 (0.1150)  0.2196 (0.1890)  0.2058 (0.1085)  0.2321 (0.0920) 
M&A +  -0.1685 (0.1460)  -0.1575 (0.3280)  -0.1670 (0.1485)  -0.1347 (0.2145) 
HighTech +  0.0169 (0.4720)  -0.0074 (0.9760)  0.0108 (0.4820)  0.1120 (0.3285) 
PyLoss ?  0.4396 (0.0100)  0.4679 (0.0060)  0.4475 (0.0080)  0.3173 (0.0770) 
Age ?  0.0006 (0.9050)  0.0003 (0.9590)  0.0005 (0.9190)  -0.0010 (0.8490) 
MB ?  -0.0273 (0.4120)  -0.0232 (0.5030)  -0.0267 (0.4270)  -0.0159 (0.6180) 
MV ?  -0.1331 (0.1840)  -0.1364 (0.1740)  -0.1335 (0.1830)  -0.1162 (0.2780) 
Afol ?  -0.0008 (0.9500)  -0.0022 (0.8690)  -0.0011 (0.9330)  -0.0068 (0.6270) 
RetVol ?  -8.1425 (0.4230)  -7.3409 (0.4720)  -7.7634 (0.4440)  -17.9113 (0.1200) 
EarnAnnLag ?  -0.0016 (0.7910)  -0.0015 (0.8110)  -0.0015 (0.8060)  -0.0009 (0.8930) 
              
Χ2-test of β2=β3:   6.66 (p = 0.0099)  5.72 (p = 0.0168)  6.55 (p = 0.0105)  2.99 (p = 0.0837) 
Χ2-test of β5=β6:   0.3 (p = 0.5813)  0.35 (p = 0.5515)  0.33 (p = 0.5661)  0.47 (p = 0.4909) 
              
Pseudo R2   0.0876  0.1045  0.2576  0.2576 
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Variable Definitions and Construction 
Panel A: Equation (1) Variables 
  
Variables Definition 
BtdDisc  one if firm i’s fourth quarter earnings announcement at the end of year t includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise.  
See Appendix B for a list primary deferred tax terms used to form this variable.  This variable is also created for the full earnings 
release, the financial statement component of the release, and the text component of the release. 
DTE  firm i’s deferred tax expense in the year t grossed up by the statutory tax rate and scaled by average total assets.  [(#269 + 
#270)/.35]/[(#6 + lagged #6)/2]; if (#269 + #270) is missing, it is replaced with #50 
LrgPosDTE one if firm i’s DTE is in the highest quintile of all firm DTEs in year t. 
LrgNegDTE one if firm i’s DTE is in the lowest quintile of all firm DTEs in year t. 
AbsDA one of two earnings quality measures.  The first (AbsDA) is the absolute value of firm i’s discretionary accruals at the end of year 
t, estimating using a modified Jones’ model (DeFond and Subramayan 1998).  The second (HighAbsDA) equals one if firm i’s 
AbsDA is in the highest quintile of all firm AbsDA in year t. 
CashETR firm i’s ratio of cash taxes paid to pretax income at the end of year t. #317/(#170 - #17) 
LowCashETR one if firm i’s cash ETR is in the lowest quintile of all firm cash ETRs in year t. 
NOL one if firm i reports a net operating loss carryforward (#52) at the end of year t and zero otherwise. 
ForOps one if firm i reports non-zero foreign operations (#273) in year t and zero otherwise. 
DiscOps one if firm i reports discontinued operations (#66) in year t and zero otherwise. 
M&A one if firm i reports merger and acquisition activity (aftnt#37) during the current year and zero otherwise. 
HighTech one if the firm i’s SIC in year t is in 2833-2836 (drugs), 8731-8734 (R&D services), 7371-7379 (programming), 3570-3577 
(computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), or 3810-3845 (precise measurement instruments) and zero otherwise. 
PyLoss one if firm i reported a loss (#18) in year t-1 and zero otherwise. 
Age the current year minus the first year firm i is publicly traded (according to the CRSP database). 
MB firm i’s ratio of market capitalization (#25 + #199) to book value of equity (#60) at the end of year t. 
MV the natural log of firm i’s market value (#25*#199) at the end of year t. 
AFol the number of unique analysts following firm i (per I/B/E/S) in year t. 
RetVol the standard deviation of firm i’s stock returns over the 250 days prior to the earnings announcement date (where at least 100 
days of stock returns are required for inclusion in the sample). 
AbsFErr one if the absolute value of the firm i’s forecast error (defined as reported earnings minus the most recent consensus mean 
analysts’ forecast from the I/B/E/S database) is larger than one cent during the current year and zero otherwise. 
EarnAnnLag the number of days between the fiscal year-end date and the earnings announcement. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definitions and Construction 
Panel B: Additional Equation (2) and (3) Variables 
Variables Definition 
FErrt+1 firm i’s actual t+1 earnings minus the median individual forecast made during month 1 (or month 5), scaled by month 1 stock price.  Month 
1 is based on the 30-day forecasting period following the release of year t's earnings information.  If an analyst makes more than one forecast 
during that window, only the most recent forecast is retained.  To mitigate the influence of data coding-errors and extreme observations, 
prior to computing the median individual forecast, any individual forecast in the highest and lowest 1% of the distribution of price-scaled 
forecast errors is eliminated. 
rTax firm i’s decile ranking based on the ratio of estimated taxable income [(#63 + #64)/.35*(1-.65)] to book income (#18) in year t, scaled to a 
[0,1] range.  If (#63 + #64) is missing, it is replaced with (#16 - #50). 
∆AFolt+1 the change in the number of unique analysts making earnings forecasts for firm i from year t to t+1, scaled by the number of year t analysts. 
PyFE firm i’s actual year t earnings minus the median individual forecast of those earnings from midyear (month 6) of year t, scaled by stock price 
(Teoh and Wong 2002). 
Acc the ratio of firm i’s total accruals to total assets at the end of year t.  Accruals are measure as as (∆Current assets - ∆Cash) - (∆Current 
liabilities - ∆Debt included in current liabilities) - ∆Deferred tax liability - Depreciation.  (∆#4 - ∆1) - (∆#5 - ∆#34) - ∆#35 - #14 
Panel C: Additional Equation (4) and (5) Variables 
Variables Definition 
SARt+1 firm i’s size-adjusted annual buy-hold return starting four months after the end of fiscal year t, calculated as the raw annual return minus the 
return on the corresponding size decile portfolio from the CRSP database. 
Beta firm i’s measure of systematic risk estimated using monthly stock return and CRSP value-weighted index returns (including distributions) 
during the five years that end in the fourth month of year t+1 (Fama and French 1992). 
EP firm i’s ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to market value of common equity at the end of year t (Basu 1977). 
Panel D: Additional Equation (6) and (7) Variables 
Variables Definition 
αp the average monthly abnormal return to a BTD-based hedge portfolio 
Rp,t the return on a calendar-time hedge portfolio based on purchasing (selling short) firms in the highest (lowest) TAX quintile each month. 
Rm,t - Rf,t the Fama and French (1993) factor representing the monthly excess return of the market 
SMB the Fama and French (1993) factor representing the monthly return difference between a portfolio of small and big stocks 
HML the Fama and French (1993) factor representing the monthly return difference between high and low book-to-market stocks 
CcDisc one if firm i’s fourth quarter conference call at the end of year t includes BTD-related information and zero otherwise. This variable is 
created for the full call, the Q&A component of the call, and the management discussion component of the call. 
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Category: Book-Tax Differences Category: Cash Tax Rate
book-tax diff cash tax
book tax diff cash effective tax
book-tax gap effective cash tax
book tax gap cash ETR
book tax taxes paid
book-tax tax paid
tax gap
 BTD Category: Marginal Tax Rate
marginal tax
Category: Primary Deferred Tax Terms  MTR 
deferred income tax
deferred tax Category: General Tax Terms
income taxes (deferred) income tax asset
income taxes - deferred income tax liability
income taxes-deferred tax asset
income tax (deferred) taxable income
income tax - deferred tax rate
deferred tax expense average tax
deferred tax revenue income taxes payable
deferred tax asset income tax
deferred tax liability reorg
Tax deferral AMT 
Tax defer Alternative minimum tax
deferred income tax asset Minimum tax
deferred income tax liablity current tax asset
income taxes deferred tax expense
tax - deferred total tax
tax (deferred) total tax expense
tax deferred
taxes - deferred Category: Ambiguous General Tax Terms
taxes (deferred) tax 
taxes deferred after-tax
after tax




tax cushion net of tax
tax reserve taxes
permanently reinvest  tax
indefinitely reinvest post tax
current tax
current tax expense Category: Ambiguous Tax Variables
carry forward






Search Terms and Classifications
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Category: Tax Planning/Avoidance Category: Tax Shelter (continued)
tax plan Notice 2001 17
tax manage Notice 200117
tax shield Notice 2001/17
tax sav section 351
tax haven 351 contingent
Notice 2001-45
Category: Tax Shelter Notice 2001 45
listed transaction Notice 200145
tax shelter Notice 2001/45
shelter tax basis-shifting
IRS notice basis shifting
Internal Revenue Service notice section 302
abusive transaction Notice 2002-21
Revenue Ruling 90-105 Notice 2002 21
Revenue Ruling 90 105 Notice 200221
Revenue Ruling 90105 Notice 2002/21
Revenue Ruling 90/105 CARDS Transaction
accelerated deductions for contribution inflated basis transaction
ASA investering Notice 2002-35
ACM partnership Notice 2002 35
1.643 Notice 200235
corporate distributions of encumbered Notice 2002/35
corporate distribution of encumbered Notional principal contract
distributions of encumbered property Common trust fund straddle
distribution of encumbered property pass through entity straddle
step-down preferred pass-through entity straddle
step down preferred Revenue Ruling 2002-69
fast pay stock Revenue Ruling 2002 69
1.7701 Revenue Ruling 200269
Revenue Ruling 2000-12 Revenue Ruling 2002/69
Revenue Ruling 2000 12  LILO 
Revenue Ruling 200012 Revenue Ruling 2003-6
Revenue Ruling 2000/12 Revenue Ruling 2003 6
Notice 2000-44 Revenue Ruling 20036
Notice 2000 44 Revenue Ruling 2003/6
Notice 200044 Notice 2003-22
Notice 2000/44 Notice 2003 22
Partnership basis transaction Notice 200322
son of boss Notice 2003/22
Notice 2000-61 offshore deferred compensation
Notice 2000 61 Notice 2003-24
Notice 200061 Notice 2003 24
Notice 2000/61 Notice 200324
guam trust Notice 2003/24
Notice 2001-16 collectively bargained welfare
Notice 2001 16 419A
Notice 200116 transfers of compensatory stock options
Notice 2001/16 Notice 2003-55
Notice 2001-17 Notice 2003 55
Appendix B (continued)




Category: Tax Shelter (continued) Category: Tax Shelter (continued)
Notice 200355 Notice 200430
Notice 2003/55 Notice 2004/30
Accounting for lease strips shelter involving shifting income
lease strips transaction shifting income to a tax exempt
lease strip transaction Notice 2004-31
other stripping transaction Notice 2004 31
Notice 2003-77 Notice 200431
Notice 2003 77 Notice 2004/31
Notice 200377 Notice 2005-13
Notice 2003/77 Notice 2005 13
improper use of contested liabilit Notice 200513
contested liability trust Notice 2005/13
accelerate deductions for contested liabilit lease-out
major/minor tax Sale in lease
major minor tax sale-in lease
minor/major tax sale-in-lease
minor major tax SILO 
major-minor tax Notice 2007-57
minor-major tax Notice 2007 57
tax avoidance using offsetting Notice 200757
offsetting foreign currency option contract Notice 2007/57
Notice 2004-8 Loss Importation
Notice 2004 8 Importation Transaction
Notice 20048 Notice 2007-83
Notice 2004/8 Notice 2007 83
Abusive Roth Notice 200783
Abusive IRA Notice 2007/83
Revenue Ruling 2004-20 Abusive Trust Arrangement
Revenue Ruling 2004 20 Notice 2008-34
Revenue Ruling 200420 Notice 2008 34
Revenue Ruling 2004/20 Notice 200834
Abusive transactions involving insurance Notice 2008/34
insurance policies in IRC DAT Transaction
IRC 412 Distressed Asset Trust
412i COLI 
412-i
412(i) Category: Ambiguous Tax Shelter Terms
Insurance Policies in Retirement Plan Revenue ruling
Notice 2004-20 qualified cash
Notice 2004 20 deferred arrangement
Notice 200420 matching contribution
Notice 2004/20 defined contribution plan
Abusive foreign tax credit voluntary employee beneficiary
Abusive FTC employee beneficiary
Abusive foreign tax beneficiary association
Abusive foreign transactions treasury reg
Abusive tax distributions from charitable remainder
Notice 2004-30 distribution from charitable remainder
Notice 2004 30 charitable remainder
Appendix B (continued)




Category: Ambiguous Tax Shelter Terms Category: Net Operating Losses
remainder trust net operating loss
 BOSS NOL 
encumbered NOLs 
distribution loss carryforward
debt straddle loss carry forward
Inflated partnership basis
Stock Compensation Transaction Category: Rate Reconciliation
intermediary transaction rate differential
contigent liability rate reconciliation
transaction
inflated basis Category: U.S. Taxes
CARDS income taxes - domestic
S Corp income taxes - U.S.
Lease in income taxes - US
lease out income tax - U.S.
Abuses associated income tax - US
S Corp ESOP domestic income tax
S Corporation ESOP domestic tax
S-Corp domestic tax rate
ESOP U.S. income tax
Abuse U.S. tax
deferred compensation arrangement U.S. tax rate
certain trust arrangement US income tax
exception US tax
compensatory stock US tax rate
compensatory option
related person Category: Foreign Taxes
contested liabilit income tax (foreign)
deduct income taxes - foreign
offsetting foreign currenc income tax - foreign
tax avoidance foreign income tax
S-Corp ESOP foreign tax
Employee Stock Option Plan foreign tax rate
income shifting international tax
shifting income international tax rate
tax exempt
intercompany financing through partnerships
Category: Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 109
financing through partnerships FAS 109
sale in FAS109
sale-in Standard 109
 LIT Number 109
Cash Value of Life Insurance Polic No. 109
Purportedly to Provide Welfare Benefit APB 23
 DAT APB23
Corporate owned life insurance Bulletin 23
Corporate-owned life insurance SFAS 109
owned life insurance
Appendix B (continued)
Search Terms and Classifications
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Category: Financial Interpretation Number 48 Category: Internal Revenue Service
FIN 48 internal revenue service
FIN48 tax penalty
Number 48 tax return
No. 48 examination
No.48 transfer pric
Uncertain tax closed year return
Uncertain tax benefit closed-year return
Uncertain tax position open year return
Undetermined tax open-year return
 UTB tax settlement
Unrecognized tax IRS settlement
Unrecognized tax benefit Internal revenue service settlement
tax court
Category: Jobs Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 tax case
JGTRRA audit settlement
Jobs growth and tax IRS 
Tax relief reconciliation statute of limitation
Category: American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 Category: Permanent vs. Temporary
domestic manufacturing deduct temporary diff
 DMD permanent diff




american jobs creation sustain
jobs creation




export sales benefit Category: Special Entitites
export sales incentive off-balance sheet
export sales tax off balance sheet
export tax incentive special purpose entit
manufacturing deduct
production deduct Category: Tax Credits
reinvestment plan credit carryforward
 FSC tax credit
credit carry forward
Category: Tax Law
tax law Category: Domestic Operations








Category: Share-Based Compensation/Option 
Valuation
foreign income SFAS 123
foreign activit standard 123
foreign earnings No. 123
foreign operations Number 123
foreign ops lattice
foreign sales corp binomial
trinomial
Category: Discontinued Operations monte carlo
discontinued operations black-scholes
discontinued ops black scholes
valuation model
Category: Fraud/Restatements model input
Fraud option value








Category: Benchmarks stock based
earnings target vest
earnings forecast accelerated vest
forecast volatility
Miss earnings dividend yield
Missed earnings expected life
Consensus expected term
Consensus forecast risk free rate




Met earning early exercise




Last quarter discount rate
Last year 123 R
Prior quarter lattice model
Prior year nontransferability










Category: Payout policy Category: Financial Regulation Terms (continued)
shareholder payout Accounting for certain investments
payout SFAS 121
share repurchase Standard 121
repurchase share No. 121
dividend Number 121
Accounting for the impairment




conservative Goodwill and other intangible
conservatism SFAS 144
safe Standard 144
safe estimate No. 144
estimate Number 144
aggressive Impairment or disposal
economic effect Disposal of long
economic impact SFAS 114
economic earnings Standard 114
significant effect No. 114
significant impact Number 114




 accru Number 125
book income
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial 
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities 
subprime Servicing of Financial Assets
credit default swap Extinguishments of liabilities
SFAS 134
Category: Mergers and Acquisitions Standard 134
merger No. 134
acquisition Number 134
Accounting for Mortgage-Backed Securities Retained 
after the Securitization of Mortgage Loans Held for Sale 
by a Mortgage Banking Enterprise 
Category: Financial Regulation Terms SFAS 140
SFAS 106 Standard 140
Standard 106 No. 140
No. 106 Number 140
Number 106
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial 
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities – a 
replacement of FASB Statement No. 125 
Employers’ accounting for post SFAS 112
SFAS 115 Standard 112
Standard 115 No. 112
No. 115 Number 112
Number 115 Accounting for Postemployment Benefits 
Appendix B (continued)




Category: Financial Statements (continued) Category: Miscellaneous Terms
Statement of Operation deferred
Statement of Income income-deferred
Statement of Earning income - deferred
Statements of Operation income (deferred)
Statements of Income cushion
Statements of Earning reserve
Income Statement shelter
Earnings statement credit
Cash Flow Statement  FIFO 
Statement of Cash Flow LIFO 
Statements of Cash carryforward

























Search Terms and Classifications
This study relies on textual analysis to identify firms that disclose BTD information in earnings releases.  Firm-year 
observations are classified as “disclosers” when earnings releases contain one or more of the primary deferred tax 




The Wall Street Journal Excerpts Highlighting Deferred Tax Information 
 
The following excerpts are examples of media articles that highlight the effects of 
deferred taxes on firms’ reported financial information.  In the first except, the author 
highlights that Freddie Mac’s net worth was overstated due to deferred tax assets of 
questionable value.  In the second and third articles, the authors discuss how deferred 
taxes significantly impacted reported earnings. 
 
Example 1 
Heard on the Street 
Time for Fannie, Freddie? --- Prices Look Cheap, But Danger Lurks In Common 
Equity 
By Peter Eavis 
8 July 2008 
The Wall Street Journal 
(Copyright (c) 2008, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.) 
 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took another beating Monday, and investors may be 
wondering if it is time to buy shares in the government-sponsored mortgage buyers. 
 
But perhaps the right question is whether the common equity in Fannie and Freddie will 
have any value left once the housing crisis is done. 
 
Fannie closed down 16% Monday, while Freddie dropped 18%. Both companies' share 
prices already had been more than halved this year. 
 
How bad could it get? The best worst-case scenario looks to be large capital raises in 
which millions of new common shares are issued, diluting the holdings of existing 
shareholders. FBR Capital Markets analyst Paul Miller believes each company needs to 
raise an extra $15 billion in common equity. 
 
Not easy to do. Fannie, for instance, has a current market value of about $15 billion. That 
means that at its current stock price it would have to roughly double its shares 
outstanding to raise $15 billion. 
 
And it isn't clear just how much new capital Fannie and Freddie need. Mr. Miller's $15 
billion could prove optimistic. Each quarter, Fannie and Freddie release an estimate of 
the market value of their balance sheets and net worth. At the end of March, Freddie's net 
worth available to common shareholders was negative to the tune of $16.9 billion. 
 
But even that number was inflated by a $16.6 billion deferred-tax asset, which has a 
questionable value. In other words, Freddie would have to issue more than $30 billion 





Business Brief -- Aflac Inc.: Net Profit Declines by 11% In Absence of Tax Benefit 
Dow Jones Newswires 
31 January 2006 
The Wall Street Journal 
(Copyright (c) 2006, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.) 
 
Aflac Inc.'s fourth-quarter profit fell 11% from a year earlier, when the company 
benefited from a tax-related gain. The Columbus, Ga., provider of supplemental health 
insurance reported fourth-quarter net income of $364 million, or 72 cents a share, down 
from $410 million, or 80 cents a share, in the year-earlier period. 
 
The latest quarter included realized investment gains of $68 million, while the year-
earlier period benefited by $128 million from the release of a valuation allowance for 
deferred tax assets resulting from the American Jobs Creation Act (emphasis added). 
Revenue rose 3.5% to $3.57 billion. Aflac said it plans to lift its quarterly dividend 18% 
to 13 cents a share. If approved by the company's board, the dividend would be paid 
March 1 to shareholders of record on Feb. 17. 
 
Example 3 
Business Brief -- COBRA ELECTRONICS CORP.: One-Time Tax Gain Helps 
Profit Soar to $12 Million 
26 February 1999 
The Wall Street Journal 
(Copyright (c) 1999, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.) 
 
Cobra Electronics Corp.'s fourth-quarter earnings soared because of a one-time tax 
benefit (emphasis added). Net income for the maker of consumer electronics totaled $12 
million, or $1.92 a diluted share, up dramatically from year-earlier net of $725,000, or 11 
cents a share. The latest quarter's net was swollen by a $10.4 million tax benefit related 
to certain deferred-tax assets (emphasis added). Without the gain, the company said, net 
would have totaled $1.6 million, or 15 cents a share. Sales climbed 32% to $33.6 million 
from $25.4 million. The company said the solid sales increase, and the wider profit 
margins, reflect in part a positive market response to new two-way radio products it 




Press Release Excerpts Including Disclosures of Book-Tax Differences Information 
 
The following excerpts are examples of disclosures of deferred tax information from 
earnings releases.  In the first example, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. discloses 
deferred tax information in its balance sheet and income statement.  In the second 
example, FastenTech, Inc. discloses deferred tax information in its cash flow statement.  
In the final example, American Pacific discloses deferred tax information in the text of 
the press release. 
 
Example 1: Balance Sheet and Income Statement Excerpts 
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters Reports Fiscal 2006 Strong Fourth Quarter and 
Full Year Results 
 
                GREEN MOUNTAIN COFFEE ROASTERS, INC. 
                Consolidated Statements of Operations 
            (Dollars in thousands except per share data) 
 
                       Thirteen               Fifty three Fifty two 
                         weeks      Twelve       weeks       weeks 
                         ended    weeks ended    ended       ended 
                      September   September   September   September 
                        30, 2006    24, 2005    30, 2006    24, 2005 
 
Net sales             $   66,875  $   36,404  $  225,323  $  161,536 
Cost of sales             41,724      23,886     143,289     104,561 
                      ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
     Gross profit         25,151      12,518      82,034      56,975 
 
Selling and operating 
 expenses                 14,350       6,780      46,808      31,517 
General and 
 administrative 
 expenses                  6,380       1,954      17,112       9,554 
                      ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
     Operating income      4,421       3,784      18,114      15,904 
 
Other income                 (24)         69         202         163 
Interest expense          (1,816)        (41)     (2,261)       (498) 
                      ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
     Income before 
      income taxes         2,581       3,812      16,055      15,569 
                                                          ----------- 
 
Income tax expense        (1,047)     (1,437)     (6,649)     (6,121) 
                      ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
     Income before 
      equity in 
      earnings of 
      Keurig, 
      Incorporated, 
      net of taxes         1,534       2,375       9,406       9,448 
Equity in earnings of 
 Keurig, 
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 Incorporated, net of 
 taxes                         -          60        (963)       (492) 
                      ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
     Net income       $    1,534  $    2,435  $    8,443  $    8,956 
                      =========== =========== =========== =========== 
 
     Basic income per 
      share: 
     Weighted average 
      shares 
      outstanding      7,543,728   7,397,345   7,505,567   7,192,431 
     Net income       $     0.20  $     0.33  $     1.12  $     1.25 
 
     Diluted income 
      per share: 
     Weighted average 
      shares 
      outstanding      7,937,019   7,860,450   7,909,116   7,666,832 
                      $     0.19  $     0.31  $     1.07  $     1.17 
   
                 GREEN MOUNTAIN COFFEE ROASTERS, INC. 
                     Consolidated Balance Sheets 
                        (Dollars in thousands) 
                                                   September September 
                                                    30, 2006  24, 2005 
 
          Assets 
Current assets: 
   Cash and cash equivalents                         $1,066    $6,247 
 Restricted cash and cash equivalents                   208       203 
 Receivables, less allowances of $1,021 and $544 at 
  September 30, 2006, and September 24, 2005, 
  respectively                                       30,071    16,548 
   Inventories                                       31,796    14,072 
   Other current assets                               2,816     1,274 
   Income tax receivable                                618         - 
   Deferred income taxes, net                         1,384     1,346 
                                                   --------- --------- 
    Total current assets                             67,959    39,690 
 
Fixed assets, net                                    49,800    39,507 
Investment in Keurig, Inc.                                -     9,765 
 Intangibles                                         39,019         - 
Goodwill                                             75,305     1,446 
Other long-term assets                                2,912       739 
                                                   --------- --------- 
 
                                                   $234,995   $91,147 
                                                   ========= ========= 
 
          Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity 
Current liabilities: 
   Current portion of long-term debt                    $97    $3,530 
   Accounts payable                                  24,113    11,228 
   Accrued compensation costs                         5,606     1,929 
   Accrued expenses                                   9,108     5,054 
   Other short-term liabilities                         874        60 
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   Income tax payable                                     -       717 
                                                   --------- --------- 
    Total current liabilities                        39,798    22,518 
                                                   --------- --------- 
 
 Long-term revolving line of credit                 102,800         - 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Long-term debt                                           71     5,218 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Deferred income taxes                                17,386     3,019 
                                                   --------- --------- 
 
Commitments and contingencies 
Stockholders' equity: 
 Common stock, $0.10 par value: Authorized - 
  20,000,000 shares; Issued - 8,786,505 and 
  8,638,281 shares at September 30, 2006 and 
  September 24, 2005, respectively                      879       864 
 Additional paid-in capital                          36,070    29,651 
 Retained earnings                                   46,138    37,695 
 Accumulated other comprehensive (loss)                (548)      (72) 
 ESOP unallocated shares, at cost - 15,205 shares      (263)     (410) 
 Treasury shares, at cost - 1,157,554 shares         (7,336)   (7,336) 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Total stockholders' equity                           74,940    60,392 
                                                   --------- --------- 
 
                                                   $234,995   $91,147 
                                                   ========= ========= 
 
Example 2: Cash Flow Statement Excerpt 
FastenTech, Inc. Reports Fiscal 2006 Fourth Quarter and Full Year Results 
 
                  FastenTech, Inc. and Subsidiaries 
            Condensed Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows 
                        (Amounts in Thousands) 
                             (Unaudited) 
 
                                                   Twelve Months ended 
                                                      September 30, 
                                                     2006      2005 
                                                   ------------------- 
Cash flows from operating activities 
Net income                                           $3,265    $6,398 
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash 
 provided by (used in) operating activities: 
   Depreciation                                      14,593    10,995 
   Amortization                                       5,382     2,340 
   Noncash interest expense-long term debt            1,453     1,444 
   Noncash interest expense-redeemable preferred 
    stock                                             2,894     3,454 
   Gain on repurchase of redeemable preferred 
    stock                                            (2,210)   (4,035) 
   Deferred income taxes                              2,429      (255) 
   Loss on sale of discontinued product line          2,284         - 
   Loss on write-off of property, plant and 
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    equipment                                             -     1,597 
   Changes in operating assets and liabilities: 
      Accounts receivable                            (3,147)   (2,755) 
      Inventory                                       1,048   (13,240) 
      Other current assets                             (217)      (80) 
      Accounts payable                                4,312    (2,102) 
      Accrued interest                                  479      (200) 
      Income taxes                                    1,100    (3,864) 
      Other liabilities                              (4,719)   (6,684) 
      Other                                            (169)      371 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Net cash provided by (used in) operating 
 activities                                          28,777    (6,616) 
 
Cash flows from investing activities 
Cash used for acquisitions, net of cash acquired    (20,956)  (85,595) 
Additions to property, plant and equipment          (10,057)  (14,480) 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Net cash used in investing activities               (31,013) (100,075) 
 
Cash flows from financing activities 
Net borrowings (repayments) under revolver           13,000    99,000 
Payment of subordinated notes                        (3,500)        - 
Repurchase of senior subordinated notes              (1,000)        - 
Proceeds from debt agreement, net                     3,697         - 
Debt issuance costs                                       -    (1,363) 
Repurchase of common and preferred stock, net        (8,355)   (8,485) 
Other                                                   338        26 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Net cash provided by financing activities             4,180    89,178 
Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on cash            110        21 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Net (decrease) increase in cash and cash 
 equivalents                                          2,054   (17,492) 
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period     11,730    29,222 
                                                   --------- --------- 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of period          $13,784   $11,730 
                                                   ========= ========= 
 
Example 3: Text Excerpt 
American Pacific Reports Fourth Quarter and Year-End Results 
Operating Activities. The Company reported an increase in sales of $7.9 million, or 60%, 
in the fourth quarter compared to last year's fourth quarter. Sales were $21.0 million in 
the fourth quarter compared to sales of $13.1 million during the same quarter in fiscal 
2000. Net income was $4.7 million, or $0.67 diluted per share, compared to $6.2 million, 
or $0.88 diluted per share during the fourth quarter of fiscal 2000. Net income during the 
fourth quarter of fiscal 2000 included a pre-tax impairment charge of $9.1 million and the 
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